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ABSTRACT 
The realities of low-wage work in the United States challenge our basic notions of 
freedom and equality. Many low-wage workers share the condition of being stuck in 
jobs toiling excessive hours against their will for less than poverty wages in 
autocratic workplaces. Yet the racial politics of immigration and labor are often used 
to stir hostility between low-income United States citizens—especially African 
Americans—and undocumented immigrants. Perceived competition for jobs and 
racist stereotypes are exploited by opportunistic politicians and employers as well to 
produce frictions between workers who face similar conditions. 
Still, there is a strong basis for undocumented and African American low-wage 
workers to unify. Both communities have experienced a deeply fraught relationship 
to freedom and coercion in which criminalization has figured prominently. This 
Article examines the similar attributes between two regimes of criminalization. The 
first regime is the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (“IRCA”), which 
has resulted in the criminalization of work for undocumented immigrants. IRCA, 
enacted more than thirty years ago, was the first time that Congress prohibited 
employers from hiring workers who are unauthorized to work in the United States. 
The second regime is the criminalization of non-work (i.e., the condition of being 
unemployed or of quitting one’s job to search for better employment elsewhere) for 
black workers in the post-Civil War South through the enforcement of vagrancy 
laws. A crucial feature of the Black Codes enacted after the Civil War to 
comprehensively restrict freed black men and women were vagrancy statutes that 
provided the coercive apparatus for pushing freed black men and women into forced 
labor.  
This Article juxtaposes the two enforcement regimes and brings together two areas 
of literature to draw attention to intersecting features of criminalization. Foremost, 
the criminalization of work and non-work become instruments of employer control 
in which state power is placed into private hands to fracture worker unity, to terrorize 
workers, and to discipline workers. Further, both regimes of criminalization have 
depended on racialized narratives and stereotypes to rationalize criminalization. This 
Article draws these historical parallels with the hope that such a perspective can help 
build meaningful alliances between undocumented immigrants and African 
2019 Criminalizing Work and Non-Work 291 
Americans to take apart systems of criminalization that advance exploitation, 
immobility, and inequality. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The realities of low-wage work in the United States challenge our 
basic notions of freedom and equality. Many low-wage workers toil 
excessive hours against their will for less than poverty wages in 
autocratic workplaces.
1
 Other low-wage workers barely cobble a living 
on part-time work as employers drive labor costs down by discarding 
full-time jobs.
2
 With weakened unions, the constant threat of 
outsourcing, and the ascendancy of a service economy built on low 




These alarming trends hit undocumented immigrant workers 
especially hard. The Supreme Court has sanctioned the unequal status 
of undocumented immigrant workers in two cases.
4
 According to some 
labor organizers and advocates, United States immigration laws have 
spawned modern-day slave labor.
5
 
In fact, “unfree” and “bound” labor in various forms, including 
slavery, has been a mainstay of the United States economy since the 
founding of this country.
6
 A look at history and law reveals 
                                                 
1 See VALERIE WILSON & JANELLE JONES, ECON. POLICY INST., WORKING 
HARDER OR FINDING IT HARDER TO WORK 1, 27–31 (2018); Meagan Day, 
Working Hard, Hardly Working, JACOBIN (Mar. 5, 2018), 
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2018/03/labor-workforce-unemployment-overwork 
[https://perma.cc/F4Y6-XWK9]. 
2 See Bertil Videt & Daniëlle de Winter, Job Insecurity as the Norm, BROKER 
(Mar. 10, 2014), http://www.thebrokeronline.eu/Articles/Job-insecurity-as-the-
norm#t8 [https://perma.cc/9PJP-C62U]. See generally LONNIE GOLDEN, ECON. 
POLICY INST., STILL FALLING SHORT ON HOURS AND PAY: PART-TIME WORK 
BECOMING NEW NORMAL (2016); see also LOUIS UCHITELLE, THE DISPOSABLE 
AMERICAN: LAYOFFS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES (2006). 
3 See Stanley Aronowitz et al., Work, Work, and More Work: Whose Economic 
Rights?, 16 CUNY L. REV. 391, 399–400 (2013). 
4 See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 535 U.S. 137 (2002); Sure–
Tan, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 467 U.S. 883 (1984). See infra Part II.B (discussing the 
impact of Hoffman). 
5 See JUDITH P. MILLER ET AL., WORKERS RIGHTS PROJECT OF YALE LAW SCH., 
REPEALING IRCA LEGISLATIVE PACKAGE 5 (2005) (on file with author); From 
Slavery to Employer Sanctions, The Modern-Day Slave Law, BREAK THE 
CHAINS! (N.Y.C., N.Y.), May 1, 2017, at 2–3, http://cswa.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/05/2017-MAYDAY-newsletter-FINAL.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9F4Q-T6M8] [hereinafter NMASS, BREAK THE CHAINS!]. 
6
 DOUGLAS HAY & PAUL CRAVEN, Introduction, in MASTERS, SERVANTS, AND 
MAGISTRATES IN BRITAIN & THE EMPIRE 1562–1955, at 21–23, 26–28 (Douglas 
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criminalization as a mode of labor regulation and racial control that 
was central to the project of maintaining a class of unequal and unfree 
black workers after slavery.
7
 Post-Civil War, criminal laws 
proliferated to empower planters and other southern employers to 
restrict the mobility of newly freed black men and women who sought 
to reject “slavery’s hours and slavery’s pace.”
8
 This history of 
criminalization bears directly on the criminalization of African 
American communities today, resulting in the mass incarceration of 
black men and women,
9
 the use of cheap prison labor by 
corporations,
10
 and the freedom of private employers to discriminate 
against people who have criminal convictions.
11
 
Criminalization also lies at the crux of modern immigration laws 
regulating undocumented workers. Over three decades ago, Congress 
enacted the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (“IRCA”).
12
 
It was the first time Congress made the private workplace a direct site 
of immigration regulation by banning the employment of 
                                                                                                                   
Hay & Paul Craven eds., 2004) (describing repressive master-servant law, 
indentured servants, convict labor, and slavery in the British Empire, including 
the early American colonies). See generally CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, LAW, 
LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC (1993) (tracing the 
impact of British master-servant law in constructing the employment 
relationship in colonial America). 
7 See Ahmed A. White, A Different Kind of Labor Law: Vagrancy Law and the 
Regulation of Harvest Labor, 1913-1924, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 667, 677–81 
(2004). 
8
 WILLIAM COHEN, AT FREEDOM’S EDGE: BLACK MOBILITY AND THE SOUTHERN 
WHITE QUEST FOR RACIAL CONTROL 1861–1915, at 14–15 (1991) [hereinafter 
COHEN, FREEDOM’S EDGE]. See William Cohen, Negro Involuntary Servitude in 
the South, 1865–1940: A Preliminary Analysis, 42 J.S. HIST. 31, 33–34 (1976) 
[hereinafter Cohen, Involuntary Servitude]. 
9 See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE 
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 60–61 (2010). 
10
 Heather Ann Thompson, Why Mass Incarceration Matters: Rethinking Crisis, 
Decline, and Transformation in Postwar American History, 97 J. AM. HIST. 703, 
720–23 (2010). 
11 See id. at 724; UCLA LABOR CTR. ET AL., READY TO WORK, UPROOTING 





 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–603, 100 Stat. 
3359 (codified as amended in scattered statutes of 8 U.S.C.). 
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undocumented workers.
13
 The “employer sanctions” provisions of 
IRCA prohibit employers from knowingly hiring or employing 
unauthorized workers.
14
 IRCA also requires employers to verify 
whether an employee is authorized to work through the “I-9” 
documentation process and to maintain certain kinds of paperwork.
15
 
Employers who violate either the substantive or administrative 
provisions of IRCA are subject to civil and criminal penalties.
16
 IRCA 
does not, however, impose criminal sanctions on undocumented 
workers who seek, solicit, or engage in employment.
17
 
IRCA’s employer sanctions regime is momentous not only as 
legislation promoting employer enforcement of immigration law. It is 
a potent instance of labor regulation bearing certain similarities to 
systems of criminalization invoked by employers to control black and 
poor white workers in earlier eras of United States history. Some 
commentators have begun to emphasize these shared characteristics, 
arguing that IRCA recalls or “perpetuates the shameful legacy of 
slavery in the U.S.”
18
 by handing over state enforcement powers to 
employers who wield such power to “terrorize [] workers and suppress 
worker dissent.”
19
 Labor organizers, unions, scholars, and lawyers 
publicize the “corrosive effects” of deputizing employers to enforce 
immigration laws in the workplace.
20
 Unscrupulous employers can 
take advantage of their enforcement powers by selectively applying 
the I-9 documentation process to terminate unauthorized workers who 
                                                 
13
 Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibiting the Employment of Unauthorized Immigrants: 
The Experiment Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193, 193 (2007). 
14
 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A) (2004). 
15 Id. § 1324a(a)(1)(B). 
16 Id. § 1324a(f). 
17
 Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 404 (2012) (holding that an Arizona 
statute that made it a misdemeanor for undocumented immigrants to knowingly 
apply for or engage in work was preempted by IRCA). 
18
 MILLER ET AL., supra note 5, at 5; see also Maria L. Ontiveros, Migrant Labour 
in the United States: Working Beneath the Floor for Free Labour? (Univ. S.F. 
Sch. Law, Research Paper No. 2014-19, 2014), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2457257 
[https://perma.cc/RZ6S-US3V] [hereinafter Ontiveros, Migrant Labour]; Maria 
L. Ontiveros, Is Modern Day Slavery a Private Act or a Public System of 
Oppression, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 665, 668–69 (2016) (examining the rhetoric 
of slavery used by immigrant workers and advocates). 
19
 Wishnie, supra note 13, at 216. 
20 Id. at 211. 
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Equally significant, and underscored by labor and immigration 
advocates, are the pernicious effects of IRCA on U.S.-born workers. 
Exploitation becomes universalized as employers use the 
criminalization of undocumented workers to systematically undermine 
the labor and employment rights of U.S.-born and other legalized 
workers in low-wage industries.
22
 When employers use IRCA as a 
union-busting tool to purge the workplace of immigrant workers who 
support an organizing drive, all workers at the workplace—regardless 
of their immigrant or citizen status—are weakened.
23
 When employers 
use their IRCA enforcement powers to intimidate undocumented 
workers into accepting sub-minimum wages and conditions, citizen 
and other legalized workers are also forced to compete in a race-to-
the-bottom.
24
 Based on the racial and economic stratification of jobs, 
the U.S.-born workers most likely harmed by IRCA’s employer 
sanctions provisions come from communities of color. Low-wage 
employment falls disproportionately on African Americans, Latinos, 




                                                 
21 See, e.g., MILLER ET AL., supra note 5, at 3; NMASS, BREAK THE CHAINS!, 
supra note 5, at 1–3; HAEYOUNG YOON ET AL., NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, 
WORKPLACE RIGHTS AND REMEDIES FOR UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS: A LEGAL 
TREATISE 1, 4–6 (2013) (on file with author; updated version forthcoming from 
publisher) [hereinafter NELP, WORKPLACE RIGHTS]; David Bacon & Bill Ong 
Hing, The Rise and Fall of Employer Sanctions, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 77, 88–
89 (2010); Kati L. Griffith, Undocumented Workers: Crossing the Borders of 
Immigration and Workplace Law, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 611, 630–33 
(2012); Leticia M. Saucedo, Immigration Enforcement Versus Employment Law 
Enforcement: The Case for Integrated Protections in the Immigrant Workplace, 
38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 303, 308–10 (2010). 
22 See infra Part II.C (discussing the impact of IRCA and Hoffman on citizen and 
authorized workers). 
23 See infra Part II.C. 
24 See infra text accompanying notes 145–55 (discussing the impact of IRCA on 
the ability of U.S.-born and other legalized workers to enforce labor law 
standards). 
25 See Llezlie Green Coleman, Rendered Invisible: African American Low-Wage 
Workers and the Workplace Exploitation Paradigm, 60 HOW. L.J. 61, 69–72 
(2016) (discussing demographics of low-wage employment among African 
Americans). Coleman argues that the current paradigm for understanding 
workplace exploitation focuses on immigrant workers’ exploitation, especially 
2019 Criminalizing Work and Non-Work 297 
The use of criminal sanctions to terrorize and repress workers, to 
control their wage demands and working conditions, and to attack their 
mobility has deep historical roots.
26
 This Article examines the similar 
attributes between the criminalization of work for undocumented 
immigrants under IRCA and the criminalization of non-work for black 
workers in the post-Civil War South. Specifically, this Article 
juxtaposes the two enforcement regimes and brings together two areas 
of literature to draw attention to intersecting features of 
criminalization, in which state power is used by private employers to 
discipline and control workers. 
The Black Codes enacted by southern legislatures in 1865-1867 
sought to comprehensively control and restrict freed black men and 
women in every aspect of life, especially as workers.
27
 Vagrancy laws 
forcing newly freed Blacks into working for exploitative wages under 
inhumane conditions
28
 were central to a system of criminalization 
aimed at preserving a captive workforce and abridging the political 
and social freedom of black people.
29
 
This Article argues that IRCA’s employer sanctions and the post-
Civil War vagrancy statutes reflect one another in important ways. 
First and foremost, embedded in the criminalization of work and non-
work are efforts to undercut workers’ autonomy, even when employers 
are ostensibly targeted. This lies at the heart of both labor contexts. 
The autonomy at stake is the freedom to challenge work conditions 
directly through organizing or indirectly by “voting with your feet” 
through seeking better work elsewhere. The criminalization of work 
and non-work become instruments of employer control in which state 
power is placed into private hands to suppress worker dissent, worker 
organizing, and worker radicalism. The price paid by workers is 
mobility, freedom, and autonomy. 
                                                                                                                   
Latino workers, and has contributed to the invisibility of African American low-
wage workers. Id. at 63–64. 
26 See supra note 6 and accompany text; infra Part III (discussing vagrancy, 
contract labor, anti-enticement statutes, and emigrant agent laws in the post-
Civil War South). 
27 See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 
1863–1877, at 199–200 (updated ed. 2014); JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, 
RECONSTRUCTION AFTER THE CIVIL WAR 47–48 (3d ed. 2013). 
28 See infra Part III.A. 
29 See White, supra note 7, at 670, 679–80; Jonathan M. Wiener, Class Structure 
and Economic Development in the American South, 1865–1955, 84 AM. HIST. 
REV. 970, 981–83 (1979). 
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Second, employers use the criminalization of targeted groups of 
workers to repress broader groups of workers. Criminalization 
provides the coercive apparatus by which employers pit workers 
against one another and keep all workers in their place. 
Third, the enforcement of IRCA against undocumented workers 
and the enforcement of the post-Civil War vagrancy statutes against 
black workers have depended on criminalization narratives for their 
effectiveness. These narratives exploit racist stereotypes to incite fear 
and resentment, and to rationalize criminalization. The criminalization 
narratives used to justify post-Civil War vagrancy statutes survive in 
present-day form to stigmatize African American workers and to 
obfuscate the impact of structural racism on the employment 
opportunities of African American communities.
30
 
The criminalization of work for undocumented immigrants and of 
non-work for African Americans after the Civil War represent 
different experiences that cannot be conflated. The historical context 
of criminalization of non-work—backed by systemic state and private 
violence—growing out of slavery has to be kept in mind.
31
 This 
Article does not argue that the two systems of criminalization are 
identical, only that they share crucial features that illuminate how 
criminalization—i.e., state law enforcement power—is used to 
undermine equality, mobility, and freedom in specific labor contexts. 
As well, workers under both systems of criminalization have not 
stood as passive victims. They have resisted by exercising agency and 
autonomy wherever possible and with great risk. Slavery “gave rise to 
numerous forms of black resistance.”
32
 After the Civil War, and even 
during post-Reconstruction,
33
 black workers “resist[ed] plantation 
                                                 
30 See infra text accompanying notes 158–67 (discussing derogative stereotyping 
of African American workers) and notes 268–71 (discussing the “welfare 
queen” narrative in the welfare reform debate). 
31 See Jennifer M. Chacón, Civil Rights, Immigrants’ Rights, Human Rights: 
Lessons from the Life and Works of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 32 N.Y.U. REV. 
L. & SOC. CHANGE 465, 466–69 (2008) (explaining that some critics of the 
contemporary immigrants’ rights movement reject analogies between the 
present-day conditions of immigrants and the plight of African Americans in the 
South during the Jim Crow era). Some commentators maintain that comparisons 
between the two are unfounded because of “the historical asymmetries of the 
[two] movements,” given the difference between voluntary migration and forced 
migration through slavery. Id. at 468. 
32
 FONER, supra note 27, at 436. 
33 But see id. at 595 (Post-Reconstruction black rural laborers faced stiffened white 
resistance and heightened violence, making “collective action by rural 
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discipline”
34
 through acts of labor militancy that included direct 
confrontation with employers, strikes, work stoppages, refusal to make 
contracts,
35
 and participation in evolving grassroots movements.
36
 
Further, vagrancy and contract labor laws never succeeded in entirely 
cutting off black mobility.
37
 
Similarly, undocumented workers continue to organize and join 
unions and workers’ centers despite IRCA and threats of detention and 
deportation. They have participated in groundbreaking organizing 
campaigns in the janitorial, drywall, home care, domestic work, and 
food processing industries.
38
 Their successes show that they can be on 
the “leading edge” in establishing new forms of organizing that 
challenge the traditional labor law regime.
39
 Some workers’ centers 
seek to bridge the immigration divide by trying to unify undocumented 
immigrants as well as African American and Puerto Rican low-wage 
workers in community and workplace struggles.
40
 
This Article draws historical parallels between undocumented 
workers under IRCA and black workers under the post-Civil War 
statutes with the hope that this can help workers find new ways to 
understand one another’s experiences. Perhaps these parallels can 
contribute to a sense of shared identity that workers can draw upon in 
surmounting the politics of racial division. The repeal of IRCA’s 
employer sanctions provisions will require broad groups of workers to 
engage in the fight for repeal. Addressing the economic 
                                                                                                                   
laborers . . . all but impossible.”). Foner explains, “Time and again during the 
1880s and 1890s, Southern sheriffs, backed by state militias, crushed efforts to 
organize agricultural workers.” Id. Yet Blacks continued to assert their 
autonomy. Id. 
34 Id. at 210, 573, 602; see also infra text accompanying note 196. 
35 See FONER, supra note 27, at 281–82; Michael W. Fitzgerald, John Hope 
Franklin and His Reconstruction, in FRANKLIN, supra note 27, at 244. 
36
 Fitzgerald, supra note 35, at 244–45. 
37
 COHEN, FREEDOM’S EDGE, supra note 8, at xv–xvi (discussing Black resistance 
to “efforts to immobilize them”); Cohen, Involuntary Servitude, supra note 8, at 
59–60 (explaining “the paradoxical situation whereby involuntary servitude 
coexisted with a good deal of black mobility” and “resourceful blacks could and 
did get around” the restrictions of that system). 
38 See, e.g., Ruth Milkman, Immigrant Workers and the Future of American Labor, 
26 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 295, 295, 297 (2011); Kent Wong, A New Labor 
Movement for a New Working Class: Unions, Worker Centers, and Immigrants, 
36 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 205, 206–07 (2014). 
39
 Milkman, supra note 38, at 295, 299. 
40 See infra text accompanying notes 309–11. 
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marginalization of certain African American communities will require 
broad groups of workers to engage in the fight against structural 
racism. Status differentiation through criminalizing targeted classes of 
workers not only splinters workers, but also sanctions coercion, 
inequality, immobility, and exploitation. Viewing IRCA against the 
criminal laws that regulated black workers after slavery highlights 
shared characteristics between these enforcement regimes and will 
point to the alliances that must be forged between immigrant and 
citizen communities to defeat laws that hurt the interests of low-wage 
workers. 
Part I of this Article examines the employer sanctions provisions of 
IRCA as a system of criminalization invoked by employers to 
discipline undocumented and citizen low-wage workers. Part II 
discusses post-Civil War criminal laws that regulated vagrancy, 
prohibited employers from recruiting another employer’s workforce, 
and barred the interstate recruitment of black workers. Part III explores 
the similarities between IRCA and post-Civil War criminal laws in 
legalizing inequality and exploitation. This Article concludes by 
reflecting on the need for alliances between undocumented immigrants 
and African American communities that each have experienced their 
own history of criminalization in a work context. These alliances are 
needed to repeal IRCA’s employer sanctions, to pursue common 
interests in other struggles both inside and outside the workplace, and 
to undo systems of criminalization that advance exploitation and 
oppression. 
II. IRCA’S EMPLOYER SANCTIONS AS CRIMINALIZATION OF WORK  
A.  Employer Sanctions as Employer Swords 
It is counter-intuitive that a law purporting to penalize employers 
has become a tool of intimidation wielded by unscrupulous employers 
against workers who assert their rights.
41
 Most scholars and labor 
advocates who follow the intersection of labor and immigration laws 
agree that IRCA’s employer sanctions regime has been disastrous for 
workers.
42
 According to Professor Michael Wishnie, “IRCA’s most 
                                                 
41 See Stephen Lee, Private Immigration Screening in the Workplace, 61 STAN. L. 
REV. 1103, 1119–20, 1126 (2009). 
42 E.g., Saucedo, supra note 21, at 307; Wishnie, supra note 13, at 216; see also 
Jennifer J. Lee, Redefining the Legality of Undocumented Work, 106 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1617, 1628 (2018) (referring to the “disastrous effects” of IRCA). 
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pernicious consequence has been to strengthen the coercive power 
exercised by exploitative employers over non-citizens in the 
workplace, overwhelming any disincentive based on the risk of civil 
penalty and making employment of undocumented workers irresistible 
in low-wage, labor-intensive industries.”
43
 
“Employer sanctions” is a misnomer. IRCA deputizes employers 
to enforce immigration laws.
44
 By empowering and requiring 
employers to check the immigration status of workers,
45
 IRCA hands 
state power to employers that they can conveniently use against 
workers.
46
 At the same time, the risk of IRCA penalties on employers 
who knowingly hire undocumented workers or who fail to comply 
with the I-9 verification requirements is slim.
47
 
For law-breaking employers, the cost-benefit calculus of hiring 
undocumented workers and initially ignoring their obligation to verify 
the status of workers is undeniably appealing.
48
 An employer might 
never mention anything about IRCA and the I-9 form, that is, until a 
                                                 
43
 Wishnie, supra note 13, at 215. 
44
 Lori A. Nessel, Undocumented Immigrants in the Workplace: The Fallacy of 
Labor Protection and the Need for Reform, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 345, 
348, 379 (2001); see Lee, supra note 41, at 1119–20. 
45
 Nessel, supra note 44, at 348, 379. 
46
 Wishnie, supra note 13, at 216; see Lee, supra note 41, at 1136–37. 
47
 Peter Brownell, Employer Sanctions and the Wages of Mexican Immigrants, 3 
RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J. SOC. SCI. 70, 72–74 (2017); Saucedo, supra note 21, at 
307–08; see also David Bacon, How Unions Help Immigrants Resist 
Deportations, AM. PROSPECT (Feb. 13, 2018), http://prospect.org/article/how-
unions-help-immigrants-resist-deportations [https://perma.cc/D3DS-9ASC] 
(“[F]ew employers pay [IRCA] penalties . . . . Even fewer are charged with 
violating federal law.”); Muzaffar Chishti et al., Shifting Gears, Trump 
Administration Launches High-Profile Worksite Enforcement Operations, 
MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Jan. 24, 2018), 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/shifting-gears-trump-administration-
launches-high-profile-worksite-enforcement-operations 
[https://perma.cc/D8KB-FRVZ] (discussing “checkered history” of enforcement 
of employer sanctions and possible shift by Trump administration); Natalie 
Kitroeff, Workplace Raids Signal Shifting Tactics in Immigration Fight, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 15, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/15/business/economy/immigration-
raids.html?smprod=nytcore-ipad&smid=nytcore-ipad-share 
[https://perma.cc/7CKY-9PHJ] (explaining that punishment of employers 
violating IRCA has historically been weak but noting Trump’s current signaling 
of increased worksite raids toward the goal of prosecuting employers and 
detaining and removing undocumented workers). 
48
 Nessel, supra note 44, at 361; Wishnie, supra note 13, at 213. 
302 UMass Law Review v. 14 | 290 
worker or group of workers challenges the employer’s failure to pay 
the minimum wage or overtime pay, or complains about safety 
violations, workloads, or discrimination.
49
 Then the employer will 
resort to the I-9 form as a means to rid the workplace of undocumented 
workers who are deemed troublemakers and to intimidate other 
workers into submission.
50
 If an employer filled out I-9 forms for 
workers at the time of their hire, he will hide behind the pretext of re-
verifying work documents or social security numbers to avoid rehiring 
workers who protested exploitative demands, participated in labor 
disputes, or engaged in collective bargaining.
51
 These manipulations of 
IRCA shut down organizing by sowing fear, insecurity, and division 
among workers. 
The term “employer swords” reflects reality more accurately than 
“employer sanctions.”
52
 IRCA’s apparatus of verifying work status 
rests in the control of employers; the exercise of this power is usually 
selective and strategic.
53
 Exploitative employers turn a blind eye to 
immigration status as long as workers accommodate their demands.
54
 
As soon as workers organize or lodge complaints, employers can 
quickly resort to verifying immigration documents as an intimidation 
tactic. It is at work sites with the most radicalized workers where 
                                                 
49
 Saucedo, supra note 21, at 320 n.93 (quoting JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN 
SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS 49–50 (2005) (regarding 
employers’ manipulation of I–9 requirements in retaliation against workers)). 
See, e.g., Imperial Buffet & Rest., Inc., No. 22-CA-27468, 2009 WL 2868889, 
at *39, *48–*49 (N.L.R.B. Sept. 4, 2009) (discussing employer’s violation of 
IRCA verification requirements); Mezonos Maven Bakery, Inc., No. 29-CA-
25476, 2006 WL 3196754, at *9 (N.L.R.B. Nov. 1, 2006) (finding that an 
employer violated IRCA when it demanded I-9 documents for an illegitimate 
purpose rather than for the purpose of good-faith compliance with IRCA). 
50
 Saucedo, supra note 21, at 307; Wishnie, supra note 13, at 215. 
51 See REBECCA SMITH & EUNICE HYUNHYE CHO, NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, 
WORKERS’ RIGHTS ON ICE, 4, 11–15 (2013) [hereinafter NELP, WORKERS’ 
RIGHTS ON ICE] (providing case studies illustrating the employer use of 
reverification of I-9 forms to intimidate workers). 
52
 Nessel, supra note 44, at 362. 
53 Mezonos Maven Bakery, Inc., 2006 WL 3196754, at *9 (“[B]y conditioning 
reinstatement upon providing proof of documented status, the . . . true motive 
was not to comply with the provisions of IRCA.”). 
54 See GORDON, supra note 49, at 49–50. 
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Employer exploitation under IRCA is not simply the product of 
cost-benefit calculations of individual employers or of lax penalties 
and inadequate enforcement against employers.
56
 The power of 
employers to manipulate IRCA’s employer sanctions provisions 
against workers is fixed in the law itself.
57
 IRCA is structured in favor 
of employers.
58
 The law incorporates an affirmative good-faith defense 
that releases an employer from liability under the “knowingly hire” 
provisions.
59
 To qualify for the defense, an employer need only 
establish that he or she conducted an I-9 document check in good faith 
and that the documents tendered by the worker appeared to be genuine 
and to relate to that worker.
60
 Compliance with the I-9 verification and 
                                                 
55 See supra text accompanying notes 48–51; Sewell Chan, Teamsters and 
FreshDirect Spar Over Suspensions of Immigrant Workers, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
12, 2007, 12:08 PM), https://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/12/12/teamsters-
and-freshdirect-spar-over-suspensions-of-immigrant-workers/ 
[https://perma.cc/MP9W-UUR3] (highlighting the controversy surrounding an I-
9 audit conveniently timed just before a union election); see also Muzaffar 
Chishti & Charles Kamasaki, IRCA in Retrospect: Guideposts for Today’s 
Immigration Reform, 9 MIGRATION POL’Y INST., at 3 (2014). 
56
 Kitty Calavita, Employer Sanctions Violations: Toward a Dialectical Model of 
White-Collar Crime, 24 L. & SOC’Y REV. 1041, 1051–52 (1990). 
57 Id. at 1058–59. 
58 Id. at 1060 (arguing that the continued hiring of undocumented workers despite 
IRCA can be attributed to the structure of IRCA in carving out a good faith 
defense for employers, thus “ensuring that violations of the ‘knowing hire’ 
provision—the real meat of the law—would be virtually risk-free”); Brownell, 
supra note 47, at 72 (discussing the low risk of fines on employers because of 
the availability of the good faith defense). 
59
 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(3) (2004). See Calavita, supra note 56, at 1058–60 
(explaining that the purported congressional justification for the good faith 
defense was to protect innocent employers who might inadvertently discriminate 
based on nationality in an effort to comply with IRCA verification 
requirements). However, Professor Calavita observes that throughout the 
legislative debates Congress left untouched the question of whether the good 
faith defense would serve as a loophole that employers could use to avoid 
detection for hiring undocumented workers. Id. at 1060. 
60
 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(b)(1)(ii)(A) (2017). There is no obligation on the employer to 
verify the authenticity of documents presented by workers. See Hiroshi 
Motomura, The Rights of Others: Legal Claims and Immigration Outside the 
Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1723, 1760 (2010) (“As long as employers check documents 
and do the paperwork, their risk of liability under [IRCA] is minimal. Further 
probing only opens them to discrimination claims.”). 
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paperwork requirements provides a structural loophole for employers 
to hire undocumented workers without detection.
61
 
Professor Kitty Calavita explains that compliance with IRCA was 
redefined during the legislative process to include compliance with the 
I-9 paperwork requirements.
62 
She argues that this generous definition 
of employer compliance actively buffers employers from prosecution 
under the “knowingly hire” provisions
63 
and, at the same time, 
“guaranteed widespread violations” of IRCA by employers.
64
 
Compliance with the I-9 substitutes for compliance with the essence of 
IRCA—the ban against knowingly hiring unauthorized workers.
65
 
The upshot was a toothless and symbolic law that conciliated two 
contradictory policies.
66
 The resultant employer sanctions regime 
mollified employers who had an economic interest in hiring 
undocumented workers
67
 and, at the same time, it gave the appearance 
of addressing the public’s demand that Congress “turn off the spigot of 
jobs” for undocumented immigrants.
68
 Proponents of enhanced 
employer sanctions assert that stiffer penalties and stronger 
enforcement against employers would help eradicate exploitation of 
                                                 
61 See Calavita, supra note 56, at 1060; Wishnie, supra note 13, at 210–11. 
62
 Calavita, supra note 56, at 1060. Making compliance easy and less onerous 
helped Congress to win the endorsement of IRCA’s employer sanctions by the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which had previously opposed the measure. Id. at 
1058–59. See also Wishnie, supra note 13, at 201–02 (describing the 
compromise legislation that secured the support of the United States Chamber of 
Commerce, AFL-CIO, and other groups that had initially opposed employer 
sanctions). 
63
 Calavita, supra note 56, at 1042. Professor Calavita argues that the IRCA 
legislative process resulted in the enactment of a law “that not only insulate[s] 
offending employers from prosecution but in effect redefines them as 
compliers.” Id. 
64 Id. at 1065. 
65 Id. at 1055, 1060. 
66 Id. at 1060 (explaining how IRCA employer sanctions provisions ended up 
becoming “symbolic” and “toothless”); see Wishnie, supra note 13, at 201 
(noting the dependence of agribusiness on undocumented workers and their 
concerns about the impact of employer sanctions). 
67
 Calavita, supra note 56, at 1065. 
68 Id. at 1059; see Wishnie, supra note 13, at 195–96 (arguing that IRCA sought to 
diminish “the strength of the ‘jobs magnet,’ deterring unlawful immigration, and 
safeguarding wages and working conditions for U.S. workers.”). 
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undocumented workers.
69
 However, contrary to this claim, the 
problem is IRCA itself. 
B.  Employer Sanctions as Criminalization of Work 
Whether and how the state intervenes or abstains is 
expressed largely through legal rules and their 
enforcement (or deliberate nonenforcement) and so 
rests ultimately on its coercive power. Law is always 
coercive . . . . Nor is the law neutral: its rules, at any 
particular time, tend to favor to a greater or lesser 
degree one or the other party in any given labor 
relation.70 
Just as Congress structured IRCA’s employer sanctions to afford 
protection to employers, the Supreme Court has sided with employers 
in delineating the rights of undocumented workers at the intersection 
of IRCA and the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”).
71
 Both 
before and after the enactment of IRCA, the Court affirmed that 
undocumented workers have a right under the NLRA to organize and 
join unions.
72
 However, the Court also held in Sure-Tan and Hoffman 
that undocumented workers, unlike other covered workers, are not 
entitled to back pay—even when their employers illegally retaliate 
against them for their organizing and union activities.
73
 And in 
                                                 
69
 Editorial, No Crackdown on Illegal Employers, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/20/opinion/no-crackdown-on-illegal-
employers.html [https://perma.cc/UHA5-XSEQ]; see Wishnie, supra note 13, at 
195 (arguing that the employer sanctions regime has made workplace 
exploitation of undocumented immigrants more prevalent). 
70
 HAY & CRAVEN, supra note 6, at 26. 
71 See infra text accompanying notes 91–123 (discussing the impact of Hoffman in 
contributing to a discourse of criminalizing undocumented immigrant workers 
and incentivizing unscrupulous employers to violate the NLRA). 
72
 Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 535 U.S. 137, 152 (2002) 
(leaving undisturbed Sure-Tan’s holding that undocumented workers are 
covered by the NLRA); Sure-Tan, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 467 U.S. 883, 892–93 
(1984) (holding that the NLRA applied to protect undocumented workers 
because there was no conflict with the Immigration and Nationality Act since, at 
the time, Congress had neither made it unlawful for employers to knowingly 
hire unauthorized workers nor made it a crime for undocumented workers to 
accept employment). 
73 Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., 535 U.S. at 149; Sure-Tan, Inc., 467 U.S. at 
903 (for purposes of back pay under the NLRA, “employees must be deemed 
‘unavailable’ for work . . . during any period when they were not lawfully 
entitled to be present and employed in the United States.”). 
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Hoffman, where an employee who had presented false documents to 
his employer was later illegally fired for joining a union, the Court 
expressly relied on IRCA to reach this result.
74
 It found that the 
N.L.R.B. had no authority to award back pay relief to an 
undocumented worker because such relief was foreclosed by IRCA.
75
 
Hoffman was especially harmful in drastically altering the legal 
terrain for undocumented workers.
76
 By depriving undocumented 
workers of the right to back pay under the NLRA, Hoffman 
empowered employers to violate the NLRA and other employment 
laws with impunity for an entire class of workers. After Sure-Tan, 
some circuit courts continued to enforce the right of back pay for 
undocumented workers who had not been deported or removed from 
the United States.
77
 These cases, however, were abrogated by 
Hoffman. In addition, three months after the Hoffman decision, the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) rescinded its 
“Enforcement Guidance on Remedies Available to Undocumented 
Workers Under Federal Employment Discrimination Laws.”
78
 The 
rescission cast into uncertainty the availability of post-discharge back 




                                                 
74 Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., 535 U.S. at 151. 
75 Id. at 147–49. 
76
 Wishnie, supra note 13, at 212. Professor Wishnie explains that Hoffman 
“overturned decades of decisions by state and federal courts and agencies by 
exempting employers of undocumented workers from back pay liability.” Id. 
77 See N.L.R.B. v. A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Grp., Inc., 134 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 
1997); Local 512, Warehouse & Office Workers’ Union v. N.L.R.B., 795 F.2d 
705, 719–20 (9th Cir. 1986). But see Del Rey Tortilleria, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 976 
F.2d 1115, 1121–22 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that IRCA precludes employees 
from receiving back pay for any period that they were not lawfully entitled to 
work in the United States). 
78
 U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC NO. 915.002, RESCISSION OF 
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO UNDOCUMENTED 
WORKERS UNDER FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (June 27, 
2002), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/undoc-rescind.html 
[https://perma.cc/F8GD-N9J6] [hereinafter EEOC RESCISSION]. 
79
 The EEOC did not determine that undocumented workers are ineligible for back 
pay under federal discrimination statutes. It stated that it was reexamining its 
position on the issue. Id. 
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The EEOC Enforcement Guidance
80
 had concluded that 
undocumented workers were entitled to all forms of monetary relief, 
including post-discharge back pay.
81
 Like the Second Circuit in 
A.P.R.A. Fuel82 and the Ninth Circuit in Local 12, Warehouse and 
Office Workers’ Union,83 the EEOC had interpreted Sure-Tan’s 
limitation on back pay to apply only to workers who no longer 
remained in the United States.
84
 The EEOC also determined that IRCA 
did not preclude back pay awards to undocumented workers in federal 
discrimination lawsuits.
85
 Given the EEOC rescission and lack of 
controlling case law
86
 on this very issue, the uncertainty whether 
undocumented workers who face discrimination will be treated the 
same as other victims of discrimination is extremely troubling. 
                                                 
80
 U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC NO. 915.002, ENFORCEMENT 
GUIDANCE ON REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS UNDER 
FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (Oct. 26, 1999), 
https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/undoc.html [https://perma.cc/4XZ7-4CSN] 
[hereinafter EEOC GUIDANCE]. 
81 Id. (explaining that undocumented workers are eligible for damages, back pay, 
and attorney’s fees—with the narrow limitation that an undocumented worker 
would be ineligible for back pay relief only if she or he was no longer in the 
United States). 
82 A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Grp., Inc., 134 F.3d at 54. 
83
 Local 512, Warehouse & Office Workers’ Union v. N.L.R.B., 795 F.2d 705, 
719–20 (9th Cir. 1986). 
84
 EEOC GUIDANCE, supra note 80. 
85 Id. 
86 See Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1061 (9th Cir. 2004) (barring 
employer from seeking discovery of workers’ immigration status in a Title VII 
suit). The Ninth Circuit distinguished the NLRA from Title VII in explaining 
why it was doubtful that Hoffman controls on the issue of back pay for 
undocumented workers in Title VII suits. Id. at 1066–68. However, the Ninth 
Circuit did not decide this issue. Id. at 1069. See also De La Rosa v. N. Harvest 
Furniture, 210 F.R.D. 237, 238–39 (C.D. Ill. 2002) (noting that due to the 
difference between a court’s authority under Title VII and that of the N.L.R.B. 
under the NLRA, it was not ready to conclude that Hoffman controlled in the 
Title VII context). De La Rosa concerned the discovery of immigration status in 
a suit alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, Title VII, and state 
labor laws, thus the Court did not decide the issue of post-discharge back pay in 
the context of Title VII. Id. But see Escobar v. Spartan Sec. Serv., 281 F. Supp. 
2d 895, 897 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (holding that undocumented workers were barred 
by Hoffman from receiving back pay in Title VII suits). 
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The outcomes in Sure-Tan and Hoffman condone inequality and 
exploitation.
87
 These cases shift the incentive structure of the NLRA in 
favor of unscrupulous employers and solidify the unequal status of 
undocumented workers. Justice Breyer stated in his dissent in 
Hoffman: 
Without the possibility of the deterrence that backpay 
provides, the Board can impose only future-oriented 
obligations upon law-violating employers—for it has no 
other weapons in its remedial arsenal. And in the 
absence of the backpay weapon, employers could 
conclude that they can violate the labor laws at least 
once with impunity.88 
Thus, law-breaking employers can profit from terrorizing and 
exploiting workers, and crushing worker resistance. 
Worse, employers can strengthen their coercive power by 
simultaneously leveraging labor and immigration laws.
89
 Take the case 
of an employer who uses IRCA’s I-9 to retaliate against undocumented 
workers who organize. Although this practice unquestionably 
constitutes an unfair labor practice, the employer would neither have 
to reinstate the undocumented workers nor compensate them for back 
pay. By law, the employer suffers no meaningful labor liability for 
violating the law twice by using IRCA to bust unions.
90
 
An equally harmful aspect of Hoffman is the Court’s discourse of 
criminalizing work for undocumented workers—a discourse that 
erases the illegal conduct of employers, despite the intention of IRCA 
to focus on employers rather than workers.
91
 Congress elected not to 
impose criminal sanctions on undocumented immigrants for working 
without authorization.
92
 The Court in Hoffman, however, rationalized 
the denial of back pay by relying on the IRCA provisions that penalize 
the use of fraudulent documents for obtaining employment.
93
 In 
                                                 
87
 Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 535 U.S. 137, 151 (2002); Sure-
Tan, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 467 U.S. 883, 906 (1984). 
88 Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., 535 U.S. at 154 (citations omitted). 
89
 Griffith, supra note 21, at 631–32. 
90
 Nessel, supra note 44, at 368. 
91
 Calavita, supra note 56, at 1049. 
92
 Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 405 (2012); Palma v. N.L.R.B., 723 
F.3d 176, 184 (2d Cir. 2013). 
93 Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., 535 U.S. at 148–49, 151. 
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Hoffman, although Mr. Castro had been illegally fired by his employer 
for joining a union, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, 
explained that Mr. Castro’s use of false documents during the I-9 
process constituted serious illegal conduct that should not be condoned 
by a back pay award.
94
 
The Board had argued that IRCA did not make workers who used 
false documents ineligible for back pay awards.
95
 Justice Rehnquist 
rejected this argument and found that upholding the Board’s post-
discharge back pay award would empower the Board “to award 
backpay to an illegal alien for years of work not performed, for wages 
that could not lawfully have been earned, and for a job obtained in the 
first instance by a criminal fraud.”
96
 
Significantly, the majority opinion never addresses that failure to 
award back pay to Mr. Castro—unlawfully fired for exercising his 
right of freedom of association—would condone serious illegal 
conduct by his employer.
97
 Justice Rehnquist dedicates only two 
sentences in the entire opinion, both occurring in the beginning, 
regarding the employer’s retaliatory firing of Mr. Castro and three co-
workers for supporting a union.
98
 The law-breaking employer 
disappears from view, and the exclusive focus is Mr. Castro’s unlawful 
immigration status and his use of a false work document.
99
 For the 
majority, the “real criminal” is Mr. Castro, not Mr. Castro’s 
employer.
100
 The comments 
                                                 




 The majority opinion notes the employer will not “get[] off scot-free”—he will 
still be subject to a cease and desist order, and he will be required to post a 
notice at the worksite about employee rights under the NLRA. Id. at 152. 
98 Id. at 140. 
99 See Nessel, supra note 44, at 367–68 (explaining that the limited back pay 
award to undocumented workers for a retaliatory discharge in the Second 
Circuit’s A.P.R.A. Fuel decision undermines both the NLRA and IRCA “by 
focusing on the status of the wronged employee rather than on the wrongdoing 
employer, the latter of which is the intended target” of both statutes); Maria L. 
Ontiveros, To Help Those Most in Need: Undocumented Workers’ Rights and 
Remedies Under Title VII, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 607, 616 (1994) 
(criticizing the focus on workers’ immigration status rather than employers’ 
illegal behavior). 
100 See Calavita, supra note 56, at 1043–44 (citing to research attributing the often 
lenient treatment that “white collar offenders” receive to “the attitude of law 
enforcers that these are not ‘real’ criminals . . . .”). Professor Calavita draws on 
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from Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy during oral argument 
evinced concerns that employers are the victims of (1) immigrant 
workers who break immigration laws and who, after termination, can 
make use of their unlawful status to avoid the duty to mitigate back 
pay damages by arguing that they cannot lawfully work in the United 




It might be plausibly argued that Mr. Castro’s employer would not 
have hired Mr. Castro had he known of Mr. Castro’s use of false 
documents.
102
 Yet this possibility should not erase the fact that Mr. 
Castro’s employer violated the NLRA. Further, the majority opinion 
neglects to distinguish Mr. Castro’s employer, who did not know of 
Mr. Castro’s undocumented status when he hired and fired him, from 
employers who intentionally violate both IRCA and the NLRA.
103
 
Thus, the outcome would be no different for an undocumented 
immigrant worker whose employer “knowingly” hired her, 
intentionally violated IRCA by disregarding the I-9 requirements, and 
later used the I-9 as a pretext for a retaliatory firing. By elevating the 
illegal conduct of workers who use false documents over the illegal 
conduct of employers who simultaneously violate immigration and 
labor laws, the Court’s discourse in effect “criminalize[s] work for the 
workers themselves,”
104
 shifting attention and blame away from law-
breaking employers. Although IRCA on its face does not criminalize 
                                                                                                                   
this research to support her conclusion that IRCA’s employer sanctions 
provisions were “written so as to label all but a handful of the most blatant 
violators as ‘compliers.’” Id. at 1045. 
101
 Ellen Dannin, Hoffman Plastics as Labor Law–Equality at Last for Immigrant 
Workers?, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 393, 400–02 (2009) (containing an excellent 
deconstruction of the comments and questions of Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and 
Kennedy at oral argument in Hoffman). Dannin details Rehnquist’s concerns 
about rewarding immigrants who have broken the law by entering illegally, 
Scalia’s concerns about whether undocumented workers could legally mitigate 
damages given their status, and Kennedy’s concerns about whether unions are 
violating public policy by organizing undocumented workers. Id. Dannin notes 
that this approach shifted the blame to the immigrant worker and viewed the 
employer as the victim. Id. at 400. 
102 Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., 535 U.S. at 141. 
103 Id. at 141–42, 148. 
104
 Bacon & Hing, supra note 21, at 86 (“In fact, punishing employers, or 
threatening to do so, was always simply a mechanism to criminalize work for 
the workers themselves, and thereby force them to leave the country, or not to 
come in the first place.”). 
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undocumented immigrants for working without authorization, there is 
a de facto criminalization of undocumented workers.
105
 
This incongruity in the majority’s analysis was not lost upon 
Justice Breyer. In his dissent, Justice Breyer acknowledged the 
particularly “perverse economic incentive” in favor of unscrupulous 
employers “[w]ere the Board forbidden to assess backpay against a 
knowing employer—a circumstance not before us today.”106 However, 
he noted that even if the majority rule applied only to employers who 
did not knowingly hire unauthorized workers, undocumented workers 
as a class would be harmed because unscrupulous employers would be 
incentivized to take the risk of hiring undocumented workers and of 
violating their labor rights.
107
 
Just as important, Justice Breyer rejected the majority’s focus on 
worker criminality, noting that the narrative of “unlawfully earned 
wages and criminal fraud . . . tell us only a small portion of the 
relevant story.”
108
 Rather, he explained, a back pay award would 
require an employer who violated the NLRA to compensate a worker 
whom the employer believed was authorized to work: “(1) for years of 
work that he would have performed, (2) for a portion of the wages that 
he would have earned, and (3) for a job that the employee would have 




Post-Hoffman, two N.L.R.B. administrative law judges used 
Justice Breyer’s distinction between “knowing” and “unknowing” 
employers to preserve a right of back pay for some undocumented 
workers.
110
 The judges in Imperial Buffet and Mezonos found that 
                                                 
105 See Griffith, supra note 21, at 618; Nessel, supra note 44, at 368; Wishnie, 
supra note  13, at 193–94. 
106 Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., 535 U.S. at 155–56 (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(citation omitted). 
107 See id. at 156 (“But even if limited to cases where the employer did not know of 
the employee’s status, the incentive may prove significant . . . the Court’s rule 
offers employers immunity in borderline cases, thereby encouraging them to 
take risks, i.e., to hire with a wink and a nod those potentially unlawful aliens 
whose unlawful employment (given the Court’s views) ultimately will lower the 
costs of labor law violations.”). 
108 Id. at 160. 
109 Id. 
110
 Imperial Buffet & Rest., Inc., No. 22-CA-27468, 2009 WL 2868889, at *56, *63 
(N.L.R.B. Sept. 4, 2009); Mezonos Maven Bakery, Inc., No. 29-CA-25476, 
2006 WL 3196754, at *13–14 (N.L.R.B. Nov. 1, 2006). 
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undocumented workers could recover NLRA back pay if they had not 
violated IRCA and their employer was a “knowing” employer.
111
 
IRCA regulations define a “knowing” employer as one who possesses 
actual or constructive knowledge that an employee or prospective hire 
is unauthorized to work.
112
 “Knowing” employers include those who 
fail to comply with the I-9 requirements or fail to do so within 
statutorily-mandated time frames; who improperly complete the I-9 
form with intent or recklessness; who disregard information indicating 
a lack of authorization to work; who selectively target workers for 
verification or selectively time the demand for verification; who accept 
documentation that does not reasonably appear to be genuine; or who 




Imperial Buffet and Mezonos reasoned that denying back pay 
liability in the circumstance of a knowing employer who has violated 
IRCA, where a worker has not done so, would reward employers for 
intentionally violating both IRCA and the NLRA.
114
 The risks of such 
illegal employment practices would fall entirely on workers instead of 
their law-breaking employers.
115
 However, this win for workers was 
short-lived. The N.L.R.B. reversed the ALJ’s decision in Mezonos, 
finding that Hoffman categorically precludes back pay awards to 
undocumented workers even when it is the employer, and not the 
worker, who violates IRCA, because in either instance, the 
employment relationship is unlawful.
116
 The Second Circuit affirmed 
                                                 
111 Imperial Buffet & Rest., Inc., 2009 WL 2868889, at *63; Mezonos Maven 
Bakery, Inc., 2006 WL 3196754, at *16. 
112
 8 C.F.R. § 274a.1(l)(1). Constructive knowledge is defined as “knowledge 
which may fairly be inferred through notice of certain facts and circumstances 
which would lead a person, through the exercise of reasonable care, to know” 
that a prospective employee is unauthorized to work. Id. 
113 See id. § 274a.1(l); Imperial Buffet & Rest., Inc., 2009 WL 2868889, at *39; 
Mezonos Maven Bakery, Inc., 2006 WL 3196754, at *11. 
114 Imperial Buffet & Rest., Inc., 2009 WL 2868889, at *61 (citing A.P.R.A. Fuel 
Oil Buyers Grp., Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. 408, 415 (1995), abrogated by Hoffman 
Plastic Compounds, Inc., 535 U.S. 137); Mezonos Maven Bakery, Inc., 2006 
WL 3196754, at *15–*16. 
115 Mezonos Maven Bakery, Inc., 2006 WL 3196754, at *16. 
116
 Mezonos Maven Bakery, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 376, 377 (2011). However, in a 
supplemental decision the N.L.R.B. found that conditional reinstatement is an 
appropriate remedy where a knowing employer discharges an undocumented 
worker in violation of the NLRA. Mezonos Maven Bakery, Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. 
360, 362 (2015). 
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the N.L.R.B.’s denial of back pay in Palma v. N.L.R.B.,117 thus closing 
the window for back pay for undocumented workers under the NLRA. 
At stake in Hoffman is not only a set of legal rules but also a 
discourse or “use of language delineating a community and its 
interests.”
118
 According to Professor Lori Nessel, “IRCA upset the 
already precarious balance of ‘membership and exclusion’ under the 
prior immigration regime.”
119
 Hoffman’s discourse of criminalization 
skews this balance dangerously further by sanctioning the inequality of 
undocumented immigrant workers through denial of the right to back 
pay. Unsurprisingly, Hoffman and its progeny have emboldened 
employers to aggressively use the law to disqualify undocumented 
workers from protections under wage and hour laws, health and safety 
standards, anti-discrimination laws, workers compensation, and even 
state personal injury claims.
120
 
                                                 
117
 Palma v. N.L.R.B., 723 F.3d 176, 185 (2d Cir. 2013). 
118
 JAMES D. SCHMIDT, FREE TO WORK: LABOR LAW, EMANCIPATION, AND 
RECONSTRUCTION, 1815–1880, at 4 (1998) (quoting Kathleen Brown, Good 
Wives, Nasty Wenches, and Anxious Patriarchs: Gender, Race, and Power in 
Colonial Virginia 5 (1996)). Schmidt explains his approach in studying the 
construction of different models of labor law in the North and South during 
Reconstruction: “In trying to understand the state by exploring law, I have 
envisioned law not so much as a set of legal rules but as a discourse or a 
language.” Id.  
119
 Nessel, supra note 44, at 361. 
120
 NELP, WORKPLACE RIGHTS, supra note 21, at 6. See also supra text 
accompanying notes 76–86 (EEOC recession of enforcement guidance on 
remedies for undocumented workers) and infra text accompanying notes 121–23 
(post-Palma efforts by employers to disqualify undocumented workers from the 
right to minimum wage and overtime pay under FLSA). Some lower courts, 
using Justice Breyer’s distinction between “knowing” and “unknowing” 
employers, have preserved the right to recover back pay and future lost wages in 
tort actions for undocumented workers who are injured on the job. See, e.g., 
Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 239–40 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(finding that neither IRCA nor Hoffman precludes undocumented workers from 
recovering compensation for lost earnings under state tort and labor laws for 
work-related injuries); Guamamtario v. Sound Beach Partners, LLC., No. 
FBTCV126023901S, 2015 WL 467234, at *11 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2015) (holding 
that undocumented workers not precluded from lost wage claims in personal 
injury action, although evidence of immigration status may be relevant to issue 
of damages); Escamilla v. Shiel Sexton Co., 73 N.E.3d 663, 668–70 (Ind. 2017) 
(finding that decreased earning capacity claims under state tort law not 
preempted by IRCA or Hoffman but noting a trend of courts finding that 
immigration status is relevant to calculation of lost earnings, subject to an 
analysis of unfair prejudice); Rosa v. Partners in Progress, Inc., 868 A.2d 994, 
1000–01 (N.H. 2005) (imposing liability on knowing employers for lost wages 
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For example, after the Palma decision in 2013, employers 
immediately challenged anew the right of undocumented workers to 
recover wages and overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(“FLSA”) and state labor laws.
121
 These challenges occurred despite a 
long line of precedent before and after Hoffman that strongly 
established the right of undocumented workers to recover wages owed 
for work performed.
122
 Fortunately, these efforts have been 
unsuccessful.
123
 Yet they are a reminder that the stability of long-
                                                                                                                   
in tort action does not conflict with IRCA’s policies); Balbuena v. IDR Realty 
LLC, 845 N.E.2d 1246, 1260 (N.Y. 2006) (allowing undocumented workers 
back pay remedy in personal injury case involving violation of state labor law); 
Macedo v. J.D. Posillico, Inc., 68 A.D.3d 508, 511 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) 
(holding that an undocumented worker did not forfeit right to lost wages in 
personal injury action even though he used a false social security card because 
this did not induce his employer to hire him since the employer did not comply 
with IRCA in good faith); Coque v. Wildflower Estates Developers, Inc., 58 
A.D.3d 44, 54 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (citation omitted) (“[T]he employee is not 
precluded, by virtue of his submission of a fraudulent document to the employer, 
from recovering damages for lost wages as a result of a workplace accident.”); 
Grocers Supply, Inc. v. Cabello, 390 S.W.3d 707, 723–24 (Tex. Ct. App. 2012) 
(finding that Texas tort law was not preempted by IRCA or Hoffman in suit 
brought by motorist who was undocumented migrant). 
121 See Rosas v. Alice’s Tea Cup, LLC, 127 F. Supp. 3d 4, 8–9 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); 
Akin v. Anion of Greenlawn, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 3d 239, 240 (E.D.N.Y. 2014); 
Kim v. Kum Gang, Inc., No. 12 Civ. 6344(MHD), 2014 WL 2510576, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2014); Colon v. Major Perry St. Corp., 987 F. Supp. 2d 451, 
456 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). See also Vallejo v. Azteca Elec. Constr., Inc., No. CV–
13–01207–PHX–NVW, 2015 WL 419634, at *4–5 (D. Ariz. Feb. 2, 2015); 
Bautista Hernandez v. Tadala’s Nursery, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 3d 1229, 1246–47 
(S.D. Fla. 2014). 
122 See, e.g., Lamonica v. Safe Hurricane Shutters, Inc., 711 F.3d 1299, 1307 (11th 
Cir. 2013); Lucas v. Jerusalem Cafe, LLC, 721 F.3d 927, 933 (8th Cir. 2013); 
Patel v. Quality Inn S., 846 F.2d 700, 706 (11th Cir. 1988); Flores v. Albertsons, 
Inc., No. CV0100515AHM(SHX), 2002 WL 1163623, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 
2002); Contreras v. Corinthian Vigor Ins. Brokerage, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 
1058 (N.D. Cal. 1998); Montoya v. S.C.C.P. Painting Contractors, Inc., 530 F. 
Supp. 2d 746, 750 (D. Md. 2008); Flores v. Amigon, 233 F. Supp. 2d 462, 464 
(E.D.N.Y. 2002); Zeng Liu v. Donna Karan Int’l, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 191, 192 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002); Almanza v. Baird Tree Serv. Co., No. 3:10–CV–311, 2012 
WL 4026933, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 12, 2012). 
123 But see Bermudez v. Karoline’s Int’l Rest. Bakery Corp., No. CV 12–
6245(LDW)(GRB), 2013 WL 6146083, at *1, *4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2013) 
(permitting employer discovery of immigration status in a FLSA action on the 
theory that Palma calls into question whether undocumented workers may bring 
FLSA claim to recover owed wages), declined to follow by Rodriguez v. Pie of 
Port Jefferson Corp., 48 F. Supp. 3d 424 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (holding that 
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settled precedent protecting undocumented workers is jeopardized as 
employers continually use their victories in Hoffman and its progeny to 
chip away at these protections. For undocumented workers, deepening 
exclusion and inequality loom as incessant threats. 
C.  Less Equal and Less Free 
The IRCA employer sanctions regime and Hoffman and its 
progeny have “consigned millions of undocumented workers to the 
underground economy . . . as employers use the law . . . to intimidate 
and retaliate against workers . . . .”
124
 If workers do not have a right to 
reinstatement and back pay, employers are empowered to crush worker 
dissent with little accountability.
125
 Scholars and immigration experts 
note that IRCA and Hoffman have deterred immigrant workers from 
contacting government agencies to complain about unlawful employer 
activity, regardless of how severe the exploitation.
126
 Given the risk of 
a retaliatory firing or an employer tip to ICE, the stakes for 
undocumented workers who try to enforce their labor and employment 
rights are extremely high.
127
 IRCA has created a structure in which 
employers can fend off sanctions and fines while workers are made 




The result for undocumented workers is greater poverty, 
inequality, and immobility. The concrete workings of employer 
sanctions and Hoffman are lived by low-wage workers in complex 
ways as they try to exercise agency in an economic system that gives 
them little power.
129
 Sometimes IRCA makes finding work harder and 
                                                                                                                   
undocumented workers who filed a FLSA action could not be compelled to 
respond to interrogatories concerning their immigration status). 
124
 NELP, WORKPLACE RIGHTS, supra note 21, at 6. 
125
 Wishnie, supra note 13, at 215–16. 
126 Id. at 213; Griffith, supra note 21, at 630–31. 
127
 Saucedo, supra note 21, at 310. 
128 Id. at 308–10, 320–21. Saucedo notes that few of the I-9 worksite audits of 
employers conducted under the Obama Administration resulted in protecting 
workers from exploitative employers. Id. at 307–08. She explains that employers 
rarely faced serious consequences from the I-9 worksite audits; on the other 
hand, the stakes for undocumented workers escalated because in addition to 
immigrants facing civil immigration violations, prosecutors also brought 
criminal charges against workers for identity theft, document fraud, or 
presenting false documents to employers. Id. at 308–09. 
129 See Jennifer Gordon & R.A. Lenhardt, Rethinking Work and Citizenship, 55 
UCLA L. REV. 1161, 1223 (2008) (cautioning against a deterministic view of 
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for that reason, undocumented immigrants will accept work despite 
how poor the conditions are.
130
 Yet employers also have a strong 
incentive to hire undocumented workers over citizen workers because 
Hoffman and its progeny render undocumented workers more 
vulnerable and exploitable.
131
 Further, to avoid competitive 
disadvantage, scrupulous employers also feel constrained to hire 
undocumented workers.
132
 Widespread abuse and exploitation cause 
some undocumented workers to feel trapped and to refrain from 
quitting their jobs in search of alternative employment.
133
 The 
increased “freedom” of employers to exploit undocumented workers 
makes it harder for workers to escape from unlawful working 
conditions. In this way, the right to quit and right to mobility are 
undermined. 
Professor Maria Ontiveros, in arguing for the Thirteenth 
Amendment as a source of migrant worker protections, points out that 
the Supreme Court in Pollock v. Williams134 singled out the right to 
change employers as central to preserving free labor.
135
 Increasing 
numbers of scholars conclude that IRCA and Hoffman create a caste of 
legally exploitable workers that recalls the institution of slavery and its 
aftermath.
136
 Some argue that denial of effective remedies for 
                                                                                                                   
African American and Latino workers, and explaining that both groups of 
workers “exercise a great deal of agency in the low-wage context” despite “their 
relative powerlessness in the economic structures in which they labor”). 
130 See Bacon & Hing, supra note 21, at 81; Gordon & Lenhardt, supra note 129, at 
1220 (discussing support of families in native countries as one reason why 
undocumented migrants would be unwilling to decline work or to protest 
workplace abuses). 
131
 Calavita, supra note 56, at 1052–53; Nessel, supra note 44, at 350; Wishnie, 
supra note 13, at 213. 
132
 Wishnie, supra note 13, at 214. 
133
 PETER KWONG, FORBIDDEN WORKERS: ILLEGAL CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND 
AMERICAN LABOR 173–74 (1997); Gordon & Lenhardt, supra note 129, at 1164. 
134
 Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944). 
135
 Ontiveros, Migrant Labour, supra note 18. Ontiveros quotes the Court in 
Pollock v. Williams to explain the importance of the right to change employers 
as central to maintaining a system of free and voluntary labor: “[T]he undoubted 
aim of the Thirteenth Amendment as implemented by the Anti Peonage Act was 
not merely to end slavery but . . . to maintain a system of completely free and 
voluntary labor . . . [I]n general, the defense against oppressive hours, pay, 
working conditions or treatment is the right to change employers.” Id. at 17. 
136 Id. at 18; Wishnie, supra note 13, at 216. See Bacon & Hing, supra note 21, at 
94–95, 95 n.129 (discussing the connection between institutionalized racism and 
immigration enforcement as contributing to a modern “social caste system”); see 
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infringements of the workplace rights of undocumented workers 
violates the Thirteenth Amendment as undocumented workers are 
coerced into working below the floor for free labor.
137
 
The corrosive effects of IRCA and Hoffman reverberate beyond 
undocumented workers because United States citizens and other 
legalized workers in low-wage jobs are made less free as well. An 
employer gains the upper hand over citizen and legalized immigrant 
workers by manipulating IRCA and violating the NLRA rights of 
undocumented workers.
138
 The unequal status of undocumented 
workers damages the ability of citizen and legalized workers to more 
effectively organize by including undocumented workers when 
employers wield IRCA as a union-busting tool.
139
 Cross-racial worker 
solidarity becomes that much more difficult to achieve.
140
 
Labor organizers maintain that IRCA’s “good faith defense” 
loophole, and the Sure-Tan and Hoffman decisions, empower 
employers to use the I-9 verification requirement to bust unions.
141
 
When an employer uses the I-9 process to intimidate or fire 
undocumented workers who support the union, the union is weakened 
because citizen and legalized immigrant co-workers are left more 
isolated and vulnerable as well.
142
 The right of freedom of association 
                                                                                                                   
also KWONG, supra note 133, at 174 (describing the impact of IRCA in pushing 
undocumented workers “further down into a sub-class of American society” and 
noting that one labor advocate has referred to IRCA as a “slave law”). 
137
 Ontiveros, Migrant Labour, supra note 18. 
138
 Bacon & Hing, supra note 21, at 88–89, 91. See NELP, WORKERS’ RIGHTS ON 
ICE, supra note 51, at 13–14, for examples of cases in which employers use 
IRCA to crush unionizing efforts, thus preventing workers from asserting their 
rights collectively regardless of immigration status. 
139 See David Bacon, Common Ground on the Kill Floor: Organizing Smithfield, 
LABOR NOTES (Apr. 20, 2012), https://labornotes.org/blogs/2012/04/common-
ground-kill-floor-organizing-smithfield [https://perma.cc/4QG7-H9FB] 
[hereinafter Bacon, Common Ground]; Bacon & Hing, supra note 21, at 89. See 
Chan, supra note 55, for a discussion of an I-9 audit that appeared to target 
union supporters just before an important union election, thus hurting the ability 
of all the workers at the worksite to form a union regardless of their immigration 
status. 
140
 Gordon & Lenhardt, supra note 129, at 1233. 
141
 Meeting Minutes of the Chinese Staff and Workers Association, “Break the 
Chains” Discussion, N.Y.C., N.Y. (July 30, 2017) (on file with author); see 
Chishti & Kamasaki, supra note 55, at 3; see also EUNICE HYUNHYE CHO & 
REBECCA SMITH, NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, WORKERS’ RIGHTS ON ICE: 
CALIFORNIA REPORT 4 (2013) [hereinafter NELP, CALIFORNIA REPORT]. 
142 See Bacon, Common Ground, supra note 139. 
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of all workers at a workplace—regardless of immigration status, race, 
or ethnicity—is undermined when an employer re-verifies documents 
to block reinstatement of workers who were illegally fired because 
they backed the union.
143
 Consequently, IRCA has weakened the 
ability of unions to organize and to defend their members.
144
 
The misuse of the I-9 form by employers during labor disputes, 
and other employer manipulations of immigration enforcement 
activities are recognized by the United States Department of 
Homeland Security (“DHS”) and labor agencies.
145
 The 2011 Revised 
Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) between DHS and the 
United States Department of Labor (“DOL”) and its Addendum
146
 in 
2016 seek to insulate immigration-related worksite laws and labor 
enforcement from “inappropriate manipulation” by employers and 
their surrogates.
147
 According to the MOU and its Addendum, DHS 
agrees to refrain from immigration worksite enforcement activities at 
any workplace where there is an investigation of a labor dispute by the 
DOL, N.L.R.B., or EEOC.
148
 This includes DHS refraining from 
conducting I-9 audits at such worksites.
149
 Further, DHS agrees to 
“thwart attempts by other parties to manipulate its worksite 
                                                 
143 Meeting Minutes of the Chinese Staff and Workers Association, supra note 141; 
see also NELP, CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 141, at 4, 8–9 (explaining how 
employers use I-9 reverification to undermine union organizing drives). 
144
 Bacon & Hing, supra note 21, at 89. 
145 See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. & DEP’T OF LABOR, REVISED MEMORANDUM OF 
UNDERSTANDING CONCERNING ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES AT WORKSITES 
(2011), https://www.dol.gov/asp/media/reports/dhs-dol-mou.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6H23-DADC] [hereinafter MOU] (establishing a process for 
ensuring that worksite enforcement of immigration laws does not interfere with 
labor law enforcement, and for thwarting employers and others from 
inappropriate manipulation of immigration worksite enforcement to retaliate 
against workers). 
146
 DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. & DEP’T OF LABOR, ADDENDUM TO REVISED 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING CONCERNING ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES 
AT WORKSITES (2016), 
https://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/basic-page/node-4684/dol-
ice_mou-addendum_w.nlrb_osha.pdf [https://perma.cc/4SPE-7SH2] [hereinafter 
MOU ADDENDUM] (extending the 2011 MOU to include the N.L.R.B. and 
EEOC as parties to the agreement). 
147 See MOU, supra note 145. 
148
 MOU ADDENDUM, supra note 146. 
149
 NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, IMMIGRATION AND LABOR IN THE WORKPLACE: 
THE REVISED LABOR AGENCY-DHS MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, FACT 
SHEET (2016), at 2. 
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enforcement activities for illicit or improper purposes,” including 
“retaliat[ing] against employees for exercising labor rights, or 
otherwise frustrat[ing] the enforcement of labor laws.”
150
 
The destructive impact of IRCA and Hoffman extends beyond 
union-busting. The practical ability of citizen and legalized immigrant 
workers in low-wage industries to enforce their workplace rights is 
diminished as employers are incentivized by Hoffman to hire 
undocumented workers.
151
 The threat that an employer can replace 
citizen and legalized immigrant workers with undocumented workers 
serves to pressure workers into laboring faster, longer, and cheaper in 
order to compete with undocumented workers.
152
 Labor activists 
emphasize that when undocumented workers are deterred by IRCA 
and Hoffman from enforcing their rights, citizen and legalized workers 
stand on weaker ground to insist on the minimum wage and overtime 
pay, safe working conditions, reasonable working hours, and non-
discrimination;
153
 they are threatened with termination or retaliation if 
“they don’t work like an undocumented.”
154
 As Professor Ontiveros 
explains, they “either must accept similar employment conditions 
themselves or go without employment.”
155
 The ability of citizen 
workers in low wage industries to quit and find other employment 
becomes harder, and their mobility, flexibility, and control are also 
weakened.
156
 Thus, the targeting of undocumented workers is used to 
                                                 
150
 MOU, supra note 145. 
151 See NELP, CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 141, at 1 (concluding that the 
ability of unscrupulous workers to use immigration status to exploit immigrant 
workers “with impunity” will result in “all low-wage workers suffer[ing] 
compromised employment protections and economic security”). 
152 Meeting Minutes of the Chinese Staff and Workers Association, supra note 141. 
153 Id. 
154 Id.  
155 See Ontiveros, Migrant Labour, supra note 18 (explaining the manner in which 
employers use immigrant guest workers to degrade working conditions for 
citizen workers). 
156 See Angela Stuesse & Laura E. Helton, Low-Wage Legacies, Race, and the 
Golden Chicken in Mississippi: Where Contemporary Immigration Meets 
African American Labor History, S. SPACES (Dec. 31, 2013), 
https://southernspaces.org/2013/low-wage-legacies-race-and-golden-chicken-
mississippi-where-contemporary-immigration-meets [https://perma.cc/98J7-
3X8R] (discussing the plight of U.S.-born workers remaining in the southern 
poultry industry after the entry of immigrant labor). Although not speaking in 
the context of IRCA, Stuesse explains that the presence of immigrant labor to 
fully staff production lines made it much more difficult for citizen workers to 
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discipline and control citizen and legalized immigrant workers in low-
wage industries, undoubtedly resulting in greater numbers of lawless 
and autocratic workplaces. The “working class as a whole” is harmed 
by the criminalization of undocumented immigrant workers.
157
 The 
outcome of IRCA and Hoffman and its progeny is to universalize 
coercion, inequality, lack of freedom, and exploitation. 
III. CRIMINALIZATION OF NON-WORK IN THE POST-CIVIL WAR 
SOUTH AND BEYOND 
The racial politics of immigration and labor are often used to stoke 
hostility between low-income United States citizens—especially 
African Americans—and immigrant communities. Perceived 
competition for jobs between low-income citizens and undocumented 
immigrants, and the racist stereotyping of African Americans as “lazy 
workers” and of certain immigrants as “hard workers” are exploited by 
mainstream media, opportunistic politicians, and employers as well.
158
 
These stereotypes are internalized by workers and produce real 
frictions. A strong social science scholarship reveals that many African 
American workers in the South blame new Latino immigrants not only 
for taking jobs, but also for being too docile, and thus responsible for 
intensifying the pace of work and driving down wages.
159
 At the same 
time, Latino immigrants blame African Americans for being lazy and 
unwilling to be productive.
160
 
                                                                                                                   
quit and find work at the same or other poultry plants. Id. This helped to deprive 
citizen-born poultry workers of flexibility and some control over their work 
lives. Id. Her point is relevant in the context of IRCA as well. 
157
 I borrow this language from Professor Heather Thompson. Thompson, supra 
note 10, at 716 (“[T]he national economy, and the American working class as a 
whole, feel the reverberations of the post–civil rights sixties turn to mass 
incarceration.”). Professor Thompson makes a similar point about the impact of 
the punitive labor system adopted in the South after the Civil War—a system 
that created effects that rippled beyond the large numbers of Black Americans 
imprisoned by it. Id. 
158 See infra text accompanying notes 181–84. See also Gordon & Lenhardt, supra 
note 129, at 1163–66, 1171–79 (summarizing social science research 
documenting tensions between African Americans and Latino workers and the 
role of employer bias); Stuesse & Helton, supra note 156 (describing 
stereotyping of African American and Latino workers in the poultry industry). 
159
 Gordon & Lenhardt, supra note 129, at 1171–72, 1226. 
160 Id. at 1172. 
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Perceptions between African Americans and Asian immigrants are 
similarly pitched. Narratives of Asian immigrants as industrious, law-
abiding “model minorities” from close-knit families are contrasted 
with narratives of African Americans as lazy individuals from broken 
homes that reject education and hard work.
161
 Asian immigrants who 
become small business owners often reproduce in their workplaces the 
racial hierarchies that exist in society-at-large.
162
 
Ethnic and racial hierarchies also punctuate the relationship 
between black immigrants and African Americans.
163
 Despite 
experiencing discrimination in the United States based on their 
                                                 
161 See Kat Chow, ‘Model Minority’ Myth Again Used as a Racial Wedge Between 
Asians and Blacks, NPR (Apr. 19, 2017, 8:32 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2017/ 04/19/524571669/ model-
minority-myth-again-used-as-a-racial-wedge-between-asians-and-blacks 
[https://perma.cc/8FQJ-SYWD] (discussing use of the perceived success of 
Asian Americans to downplay racism against African Americans and other 
communities of color); Ann-Derrick Gaillot, Black-Asian Animosity is an 
American Tradition, OUTLINE (Apr. 6, 2017, 11:54 AM), 
https://theoutline.com/post/1351/black-asian-conflict-beauty-supply 
[https://perma.cc/H8QP-ZQNR] (comparing Asian model minority stereotype at 
odds with stereotypes of African Americans as well as noting tensions between 
Korean small business owners and African Americans); Jeff Guo, The Real 
Reasons the U.S. Became Less Racist Toward Asian Americans, WASH. POST 
(Nov. 29, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/11/29/the-real-reason-
americans-stopped-spitting-on-asian-americans-and-started-praising-
them/?utm_term=.980786731f5c [https://perma.cc/V6LZ-GW8A] (describing 
the use of the Asian model minority narrative to shift the blame for African 
American poverty); Christine Huang, The Toll of Historically Pitting Asians 
Against Blacks, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 30, 2017), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/the-toll-of-historically-pitting-asians-
against-blacks_us_58d2b56ae4b062043ad4af1b [https://perma.cc/2D35-F9PP] 
(pitting of Asians against African Americans dates back to the Civil War and 
Reconstruction). See generally ELLEN D. WU, THE COLOR OF SUCCESS: ASIAN 
AMERICANS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE MODEL MINORITY (2014). 
162 See MIRIAM CHING YOON LOUIE, SWEATSHOP WARRIORS: IMMIGRANT WOMEN 
WORKERS TAKE ON THE GLOBAL FACTORY 31–33 (2001); Gaillot, supra note 
161.
 
163 See CANDIS WATTS SMITH, BLACK MOSAIC: THE POLITICS OF BLACK PAN-
ETHNIC DIVERSITY 10–12 (2014) (explaining how the influx of Afro-Latino, 
Afro-Caribbean, and African immigrants have complicated what it means to be 
“African American” or “Black”). Professor Watts Smith explains that examining 
the interactions between black immigrants and African Americans is crucial for 
understanding the conditions that can foster coalition work based on a “pan-
ethnic identity” as well as conditions that are likely to engender “interethnic 
distancing and intraracial conflict.” Id. at 3–4. 
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“blackness,” some black immigrants elevate their ethnic and 
immigrant identities above their racial identity to distance themselves 
from African Americans.
164
 Black Caribbean and sub-Saharan African 
immigrants sometimes use the narratives of immigrant work ethic to 
distinguish themselves from the stereotypes of laziness and criminality 
ascribed to African Americans.
165
 Professor Mary Waters observes of 
West Indian immigrants, “The more immigrant or ethnic the 
immigrants are, the more likely they are to have access to jobs . . . and 
the more likely employers are to prefer to hire them than native 
minorities.”
166
 At the same time, some African Americans may fault 
Caribbean and African immigrants as foreigners who fail to adequately 
understand the profound consequences of historical and structural 
racism on African American communities.
167
 
                                                 
164 See MARY C. WATERS, BLACK IDENTITIES: WEST INDIAN IMMIGRANT DREAMS 
AND AMERICAN REALITIES 341–43 (1999) [hereinafter WATERS, BLACK 
IDENTITIES]; Godfried Agyeman Asante, Becoming “Black” in America: 
Exploring Racial Identity Development of African Immigrants 53–55, 58, 62–63 
(Apr. 2012) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Minnesota State University, Mankato) 
(on file with Cornerstone: A Collection of Scholarly and Creative Works for 
Minnesota State University, Mankato); see also Kathy-Ann C. Hernandez & 
Kayon K. Murray-Johnson, Towards a Different Construction of Blackness: 
Black Immigrant Scholars on Racial Identity Development in the United States, 
17 INT’L J. MULTICULTURAL EDUC. 53 (2015) (discussing the personal 
positioning and re-positioning of identity from the perspective of foreign-born 
Black women in the Academy). This article offers a nuanced discussion of the 
complex processes and challenges of negotiating immigrant and racial identities 
in the United States. Id. at 65. The authors speak of moving away from a model 
of “mak[ing] a fixed choice between one ‘Black’ identity and another” toward 
that of “complementary worldviews” and “hybrid consciousness.” Id. at 68. 
165 See WATERS, BLACK IDENTITIES, supra note 164, at 7, 332–35, 341–43; Asante, 
supra note 164, at 30, 48, 55, 58, 62–63. See also Mary C. Waters et al., 
Immigrants and African Americans, 40 ANN. REV. SOC. 369, 372 (2014). 
166
 WATERS, BLACK IDENTITIES, supra note 164, at 331; Waters et al., supra note 
165, at 380 (noting evidence suggesting that “many employers prefer 
immigrants—including black immigrants—to African Americans in lower-
skilled jobs”); see also Hernandez & Murray-Johnson, supra note 164, at 63 
(recounting experiences in which white colleagues expressed more positive 
attitudes to Caribbean immigrants than to African Americans). 
167 See Asante, supra note 164, at 49–50 (explaining that a majority of the African 
interviewees in the study did not know about African American history prior to 
coming to the United States); Hernandez & Murray-Johnson, supra note 164, at 
65 (discussing how one author’s initial view of African Americans as not 
working hard enough changed over time as she began to see the “historical and 
present-day systematic racial inequities” at play in the United States). 
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Clearly, there is a pressing need for educational efforts aimed at 
giving different communities new ways of understanding one 
another’s history in the United States to help workers surmount racism 
and division.
168
 This Article suggests that shared ground between 
African Americans and immigrants can be built from understanding 
one another’s fraught relationship to freedom and coercion as workers. 
The criminalization of work for undocumented immigrants shares 
some similarities to the criminalization of non-work for freed Blacks 
during and after Reconstruction. The shared reality is that both forms 
of criminalization have propped systems of compulsion and coercion. 
The criminalization of work for undocumented immigrant workers 
has been used by employers as a coercive apparatus to keep 
immigrant—and citizen workers—in their place.
169
 As a consequence 
of IRCA, both groups of workers have been made less free to resist 
exploitation and less free to search for better employment. The 
targeting of one group has helped turn many working class workers 
into captive workforces. 
While not identical but resonant, a network of laws proliferated in 
the South that “worked to restrict the free market in labor” of black 
workers and contributed to their involuntary servitude between 
Reconstruction and World War II.
170
 These laws formed the backbone 
of a coercive apparatus that sought to push black men and women back 
into forced labor, reinforced by restrictions on their mobility to seek 
alternative employment.
171
 Criminalization of non-work or “the 
                                                 
168
 Gordon & Lenhardt, supra note 129, at 1235–36 (explaining the critical 
importance of new community and education programs that promote 
conversations about race and immigration and “give each group insight into the 
other’s experience and history with work in the United States” as “an essential 
first step in the process of identifying shared ground”). 
169 See supra Part II.C; Bacon & Hing, supra note 21, at 89. 
170
 Wiener, supra note 29, at 981. See generally Cohen, Involuntary Servitude, 
supra note 8. 
171 See W.E. BURGHARDT DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 167–68 
(1963); Wiener, supra note 29, at 985. 
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condition of being unemployed”
172
 lay at the core of attempts to 
establish a kind of re-enslavement of freed black men and women.
173
  
Legislatures throughout the South enacted Black Codes from 
1865–1867 as a state response to white claims that newly freed black 
people had to be stringently controlled.
174
 Many white planters, raising 
the fear that newly freed Blacks would refuse to work for them, 
enlisted the state’s help in ensuring the availability of an exploitable 
workforce.
175
 Laws governing vagrancy and labor contract 
enforcement—used to compel Blacks to work by criminalizing 
unemployment or the refusal to work—were prominent labor 
provisions in the Black Codes.
176
 Additional laws were enacted to 
undercut the ability of black workers to seek better employment by 
punishing those who recruited black workers for jobs in other southern 
states or in the North. These consisted of anti-enticement statutes that 
prohibited an employer from “enticing” away another employer’s 
laborers, and statutes that restricted agents who recruited black 
workers across state lines.
177
 
This mesh of laws—vagrancy, contract enforcement, anti-
enticement, and emigrant-agent restrictions—prevailed in one form or 
another in the South until World War II.
178
 Together, they constituted 
                                                 
172
 White, supra note 7, at 674 (discussing vagrancy law as a function of labor 
regulation and resting on “the criminalization of the condition of being 
unemployed or holding illegitimate forms or circumstances of employment”); 
see DU BOIS, supra note 171, at 166 (discussing the enactment of the Black 
Codes as premised on the white belief that black men and women would not 
work without compulsion). 
173 See David. E. Bernstein, The Law and Economics of Post-Civil War Restrictions 
on Interstate Migration by African-Americans, 76 TEX. L. REV. 781, 787–92 
(1998) (discussing the Black Codes enacted after the Civil War to “prevent the 
emergence of a free labor market”). “The more severe laws practically recreated 
slavery for African-American agricultural workers . . . .” Id. at 787. 
174
 Cohen, Involuntary Servitude, supra note 8, at 34 (describing southern calls for 
laws to control black labor and to “require them to fulfill their contracts of 
labour on the farms”); see also supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
175 See Bernstein, supra note 173, at 787, 790–92; White, supra note 7, at 679–81; 
Wiener, supra note 29, at 973–74. 
176
 COHEN, FREEDOM’S EDGE, supra note 8, 30–31; Cohen, Involuntary Servitude, 
supra note 8, at 34; White, supra note 7, at 680. 
177
 Cohen, Involuntary Servitude, supra note 8, at 33. 
178 Id. at 35–36; White, supra note 7, at 680. As White explains, though some of 
these laws were nullified or repealed by Reconstruction, they were amended or 
resurrected as facially neutral laws. Id. See also Wiener, supra note 29, at 981. 
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the legal infrastructure for white planters to abridge the mobility and 
freedom of black workers,
179
 thus establishing a “compulsory free 
labor system” to replace slavery.
180 
A. Criminalizing Non-Work: Vagrancy Statutes as Employer 
Swords 
The vagrancy statutes of the post-war South were designed to 
ensure that white planters had cheap and exploitable labor. These laws 
directly regulated black workers and aided white planters in their 
efforts to maintain labor and racial control.
181
 Narratives of black men 
and women as lazy or idle were used to lobby in support of labor-
compelling laws.
182
 By criminalizing the status of being unemployed 
or the refusal to work, vagrancy laws empowered sheriffs and police to 
“round up”
183
 and arrest Blacks who did not have labor contracts.
184
 
Those who were convicted of vagrancy could be hired out as laborers 
to their former employers or to any employer willing to post bond or 
pay their fine.
185
 Broad definitions of “vagrant” cast a wide dragnet.
186
 
For instance, Alabama’s statute from 1866 defined “vagrant” as 
                                                 
179
 Other laws that inhibited the free market in black labor included the criminal 
surety system, “which permitted convicts to serve their sentences laboring for 
private employers.” Wiener, supra note 29, at 981. Debt peonage was also used 
to extract labor from individuals who owed a debt. Cohen, Involuntary 
Servitude, supra note 8, at 32. 
180
 COHEN, FREEDOM’S EDGE, supra note 8, at 7, 11. Cohen describes the system 
that was beginning to emerge at the close of the Civil War as a “compulsory free 
labor system.” Id. at 11 (quoting William F. Messner, Black Violence and White 
Response: Louisiana, 1862, 41 J. S. HIST. 19, 34 (1975)). 
181 See id. at xiii–xiv (describing the Black Codes and laws enacted between the 
1870s and 1910 as a reassertion of white hegemony over freed black men and 
women). 
182 See infra text accompanying notes 268–71 for discussion of racialized narratives 
in support of criminalization. 
183
 Cohen, Involuntary Servitude, supra note 8, at 33–34, 47–50; Wiener, supra 
note 29, at 981; see DU BOIS, supra note 171, at 173–75 (describing vagrancy 
acts enacted in Virginia, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, South Carolina, and 
Alabama). 
184
 Cohen, Involuntary Servitude, supra note 8, at 47; see DU BOIS, supra note 171, 
at 167–71 (discussing examples of the requirement and impact of labor contracts 
for black workers in various southern states). 
185
 Cohen, Involuntary Servitude, supra note 8, at 34. 
186 Id. at 47 (stating that the vagrancy statutes enacted in the former Confederate 
states in 1865 or 1866 “defin[ed] vagrancy in sweeping terms”). See DU BOIS, 
supra note 171, at 173–75. 
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someone “having no visible means of support, or being dependent on 
his labor, lives without employment, or habitually neglects his 
employment . . . .”
187
 In 1903, Alabama’s new vagrancy statute was 
further broadened—a vagrant was defined as “any person wandering 
or strolling about in idleness, who is able to work, and has no property 
to support him; or any person leading an idle immoral, profligate life, 
having no property to support him . . . .”
188
 
Regulating vagrancy operated in tandem with a system of 
compulsory labor contracts. The Black Codes frequently required 
black workers to enter into labor contracts, sometimes by a specific 
date at the beginning of each year.
189
 Once a labor contract was signed, 
contract enforcement laws kicked in to penalize workers who broke 
their contracts, including criminal prosecution for breach of 
contract.
190
 As William Cohen explains, “The contract system could 
work only if there was some way of forcing Blacks to sign labor 
agreements in the first place.”
191
 Vagrancy laws “served as a threat to 
those who might hesitate to enter into labor contracts.”
192
 Cohen notes 
that “[B]y the early twentieth century the vagrancy acts had become a 
mainstay of the system of involuntary servitude.”
193
 
However, the vagrancy statutes must be understood as more than 
labor-compelling tools that coerced Blacks into working against their 
will. They also functioned as labor-disciplining tools.
194
 The labor 
shortages that resulted from black migration after emancipation gave 
black workers a degree of bargaining leverage.
195
 As a result, white 
                                                 
187
 Cohen, Involuntary Servitude, supra note 8, at 48; see DU BOIS, supra note 171, 
at 173–75 (describing vagrancy statutes right after the Civil War). 
188
 Cohen, Involuntary Servitude, supra note 8, at 48. Cohen states that the new 
vagrancy laws adopted in southern states between 1890 and 1910 survived 
largely intact into the 1960s. Id. at 48–49. 
189
 DU BOIS, supra note 171, at 168–71; Cohen, Involuntary Servitude, supra note 
8, at 42. 
190
 Cohen, Involuntary Servitude, supra note 8, at 45. 
191 Id. at 47; see Pete Daniel, The Metamorphosis of Slavery, 1865–1900, 66 J. AM. 
HIST. 88, 93–95 (1979) (discussing the labor-disciplining function of vagrancy 
laws and labor-compelling function of contract laws emerging from most post-
plantation societies, including the United States South). 
192
 Cohen, Involuntary Servitude, supra note 8, at 49. 
193 Id. at 50. 
194 See Daniel, supra note 191, at 93–95. 
195 See COHEN, FREEDOM’S EDGE, supra note 8, at 15–16 (at least with respect to 
the prompt payment of wages). 
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planters found themselves confronting a rising tide of black labor 
militancy that threatened work stoppages and emigration.
196
 Against 
this backdrop, southern legislatures enacted vagrancy laws to make 
being unemployed a crime.
197
 By criminalizing non-work, 
unemployment, or the refusal to work for a particular employer, the 
vagrancy acts directly attacked the right of black workers to move 
freely and mobility was crucial to asserting one’s freedom and 
control.
198
 Laws restricting mobility arose because freed black men 
and women were moving to better their wages and job conditions, 
moving from one local employer—or planter—to another, moving 
back and forth between types of work, moving to reunite their 
families, and moving to find better opportunities for their children.
199
 
Black laborers who wanted to resist by quitting to search for better 
employment, rather than capitulating to exploitative and oppressive 
employers, had to confront the specter of the vagrancy acts.
200
 
“[T]raveling in search of a new job would leave them vulnerable to 
arrest for vagrancy.”
201
 In effect, even temporary unemployment was 
illegal, and black workers could thus be forced to remain with their 
employers even after their labor contracts expired.
202
 The vagrancy 
laws, by punishing those workers who dared to disobey the 
compulsory contract labor system,
203
 aimed to make workers too 
scared to leave.
204
 Racial control and labor repression were the desired 
                                                 
196 See id. at 14–16. 
197
 Kathy Roberts Forde & Bryan Bowman, Exploiting Black Labor After the 
Abolition of Slavery, CONVERSATION (Feb. 6, 2017, 10:39 PM), 
https://theconversation.com/exploiting-black-labor-after-the-abolition-of-
slavery-72482 [https://perma.cc/4PX9-NSNF] (explaining that “vagrancy – the 
‘crime’ of being unemployed,” was the most “sinister crime” enumerated in the 
Black Codes, and “aimed at keeping freed people tied to their former owners’ 
plantations and farms”). 
198
 COHEN, FREEDOM’S EDGE, supra note 8, at 14, 30–31. 
199 Id. at xvi, 14; see also Bernstein, supra note 173, at 783, 786. 
200 See Cohen, Involuntary Servitude, supra note 8, at 51–52. 
201
 Bernstein, supra note 173, at 787. 
202 Id. 
203
 COHEN, FREEDOM’S EDGE, supra note 8, at 30–31. 
204 See Wiener, supra note 29, at 982 (describing vagrancy as among the laws 
limiting the mobility of southern black workers and the desires of the planter 
class in making most black workers “too frightened to leave” so that they would 
“remain in order to preserve the low-wage, labor-intensive system of 
production”). 
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results of undermining freedom and control through criminalizing non-
work. 
Moreover, the use of vagrancy laws to criminalize non-work 
rippled beyond the racial politics and political economy of the post-
Civil War South. The South’s system of “compulsory free labor” 
helped shape some of the vagrancy statutes enacted in the North 
during the late nineteenth century to control unemployed or under-
employed white low-wage workers.
205
 By the 1880s, modern vagrancy 
statutes regulating white workers had become widespread in the 
North.
206
 Whether regulating beggars in cities or harvest workers in 
the Great Plains, the coercive and disciplinary functions of northern 




Northern vagrancy statutes against begging—enacted between 
1866 and 1885 in urban areas—subjected people who begged to 
punishments such as arrest, imprisonment, and forced labor.
208
 Able-
bodied persons prosecuted for begging were sentenced to “compulsory 
labor” in prisons or local workhouses.
209
 Proponents of these laws 
harnessed a narrative in support of criminalization that derogatively 
                                                 
205 See Amy Dru Stanley, Beggars Can’t Be Choosers: Compulsion and Contract in 
Postbellum America, 78 J. AM. HIST. 1265, 1272–74 (1992) (noting how 
northern charity reformers sought to compel able-bodied beggars to work by 
outlawing vagrancy to combat what they perceived as idleness). Professor 
Stanley explains that most of the people prosecuted under the vagrancy statutes 
were subsistence-wage workers, who were always on the brink of poverty, and 
passed back and forth between wage labor and begging. Id. at 1269. Professor 
Stanley argues that the coercive aspects of the South’s reconstructed labor 
system “were carried back north” by northern charity reformers who had 
traveled extensively in the South, studying the transition from slavery to free 
labor. Id. at 1288. Professor Stanley maintains that these northern reformers 
were “[s]haped by their southern experience” and returned North to support 
vagrancy laws to outlaw begging and to compel beggars into work. Id. See also 
White, supra note 7, at 717–30 (describing the labor-disciplining functions of 
vagrancy acts in North Dakota during the first few decades of the twentieth 
century to undercut harvest workers who wanted to hold out for better wages 
and working conditions).  
206
 White, supra note 7, at 681. 
207 See id. at 684–85 (discussing scholarly studies documenting the “labor-
regulating functions” of modern vagrancy laws and their impact on repressing 
labor organizing and forcing workers into low-wage employment). 
208
 Stanley, supra note 205, at 1274. 
209 Id. at 1273–74. 
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lumped beggars with vagabonds, vagrants, and “tramps.”
210
 According 
to this narrative, the crime committed by persons who begged was that 
they chose idleness over work; they disobeyed the rules of the 
marketplace by rejecting work, and instead supported themselves by 
deceiving, duping, or preying on the public.
211
 Their problem was that 
they “lacked compulsion to work.”
212
 
Yet individuals who genuinely looked for work could still be 
arrested for vagrancy.
213
 Labor advocates objected to the vagrancy 
laws as penal servitude because the laws violated one’s basic right to 
travel in search of work and to ask for alms or support while doing 
so.
214
 As with the southern vagrancy statutes, workers could be 
deterred by vagrancy laws from quitting to look for better employment 
because they could not lawfully support themselves in the interim by 
asking for alms.
215
 Simply put, one could not choose to beg to avert 
giving in to an exploitative or oppressive employer.
216
 
Revealing the disciplinary function of the criminal laws against 
begging, one report by charity reformers decried “[T]he existence of a 
‘large class who make begging a trade . . . who will only do such work 
and at such wages as suit them.’”
217
 The demographic reality of those 
who begged belied the reformers’ narrative claims of idleness and 
deceit.
218
 Most people begging for alms were low-wage workers—
especially domestic workers and laborers—who teetered between jobs 
                                                 
210 Id. at 1270. “Tramp” was a pejorative term used to label people who were 
unemployed and transient. Id. 
211 Id. at 1270, 1272. Reformers held that wage laborers abided by the rules of the 
marketplace; in contrast, “The beggar was a dependent person who neither 
bought nor sold but preyed on others. The wage earner abided by the obligations 
of contract; the beggar eluded them.” Id. at 1272. 
212 Id. at 1273. 
213 Id. at 1274 (explaining that labor advocates argued that the criminal laws against 
begging “violated the freedom of poor men honestly looking for work”). 
214 See id. at 1281 (noting that a labor spokesman’s claim that it was free person’s 
“irrevocable right to travel in search of work, and he should not be ‘enslaved in 
the penitentiaries’ because he asked for alms along the way”). 
215 Id. at 1274; see also White, supra note 7, at 677 (discussing vagrancy acts as 
means for regulating labor relations). 
216
 Stanley, supra note 205, at 1282. Stanley explains that as a result of the 
vagrancy laws, “[F]ree persons could not choose to beg instead of agreeing to 
work for low wages.” Id. 
217 Id. 
218 Id. at 1269. 
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that paid too little to live on and chronic unemployment resulting from 
fluctuations in the economy.
219
 Low-wage workers passed back and 
forth between the realms of working and begging.
220
 For the working 
poor, begging could be a bridge to survival.
221
 But with vagrancy laws 
criminalizing begging, low-wage workers were shorn of a crucial right 
of control—i.e., determining when to work and under what 
circumstances, and asserting an alternative means to survive.
222
 In this 
way, criminalization helped perpetuate an employer-dominated labor 
market based on a system of substandard wages and conditions. 
The coercive power of criminalization was similarly brought to 
bear on transient harvest workers in the Northern Plains during the 
early 1900s.
223
 Here, vagrancy laws became a powerful weapon for 
suppressing the labor radicalism of harvest workers who were joining 
the ranks of the Industrial Workers of the World or its affiliate 
unions.
224
 Professor Ahmed White explains that in North Dakota, local 
officials, police, and employers used vagrancy law to force harvest 
field hands into accepting prevailing wages, thus cutting off their right 
to hold out for better wages.
225
 A harvest worker who came to town to 
find work but who held out for better wages was a sure target for arrest 
as a vagrant and risked going to jail or being run out of town.
226
 Union 
and labor organizers in particular fell victim to arrest for vagrancy.
227
 
Local officials and the police regarded them as outside “agitators” who 
tried to drive up wages by getting harvest workers to withhold their 
labor.
228
 Vagrancy law became an effective instrument of coercion to 
                                                 
219 Id. 
220 Id. at 1272. 
221 Id. 
222 See id. at 1281 (concluding that the vagrancy laws “revoked . . . [the] formal 
right of free choice” – referring to the right “to choose when, for how long, and 
for whom to labor”). 
223
 White, supra note 7, at 670. 
224 Id. at 670–71, 699–709. 
225 Id. at 716–17 (providing examples in various cities and towns in North Dakota 
in which vagrancy law was used against field hands who sought to withhold 
their labor for better pay). 
226 Id. at 718–19. Importantly, “Vagrancy was measured not simply by idleness, but 
by willingness to work at prevailing wages.” Id. at 717. 
227 Id. at 726. 
228 Id. at 727 (quoting a state employment bureau director’s complaint to police 
“that ‘agitators’ were forcing up wages by causing laborers to ‘hold out’”). 
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accomplish the twin goals of driving transient harvest workers into 
low-wage employment and quashing unions and worker organizing. 
The state, through criminalizing non-work—whether in the South 
or North—handed tremendous power to employers to compel, control, 
and discipline workers. Vagrancy law was used to clamp down on 
workers who asserted their right to freedom, their right to search for 
better employment, and their right to say “no” to their employers.
229
 In 
the case of black workers in the post-Civil War South, vagrancy law 
operated most perniciously by contributing to new forms of 
compulsory labor as part of the South’s reconstructed labor system.
230
 
B. Anti-Enticement Statutes: Swords Against Black Workers 
Vagrancy laws in the post-Civil War South were complemented by 
laws that restricted competition between white planters for black 
workers.
231
 These consisted of anti-enticement and emigrant agent 
laws.
232
 Whereas vagrancy law regulated black workers, these laws 
targeted white behavior.
233
 However, the end goal was the same—the 
private use of state power to rein in the freedom, mobility, and right of 
control by black workers. 
By imposing prohibitively high licensing fees, emigrant agent laws 
aimed to outlaw labor brokers who recruited black workers for out-of-
state employment.
234
 These laws helped restrict large-scale out-
migration.
235
 Without the financial assistance, backing, and 
information about jobs supplied by labor brokers, migration by poor 
rural Blacks became more arduous.
236
 
The anti-enticement statutes warrant special interest because, like 
IRCA, they regulated employer behavior.
237
 Employers who recruited 
                                                 
229 Id. at 716–17. 
230 Id. at 679–81. 
231
 COHEN, FREEDOM’S EDGE, supra note 8, at 5 (discussing the competition and 
conflict between white planters who favored restricting black mobility and those 
who favored the out-migration of black workers); Wiener, supra note 29, at 981 
(“[E]nticement statutes, [] made it a crime for one planter to hire laborers 
employed by another.”). 
232
 Cohen, Involuntary Servitude, supra note 8, at 33. 
233 Id. at 42. 
234
 Bernstein, supra note 173, at 791–93; Cohen, Involuntary Servitude, supra note 
8, at 38–40. 
235
 Bernstein, supra note 173, at 782. 
236 Id. at 781–82. 
237 Id. at 791. 
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another employer’s workers were subject to criminal prosecution for 
enticement.
238
 These statutes made it a crime for an employer to “‘hire 
away, or induce to leave the service of another,’ any laborer ‘by 
offering higher wages or in any other way whatsoever.’”
239
 Anti-
enticement laws sometimes functioned with the support of a system of 
documentation verification.
240
 An employer who hired someone 
without proof of a discharge certificate from his or her previous 
employer could be prosecuted for enticement.
241
 
Although regulating employers, the anti-enticement laws were 
more anti-Black and anti-worker than anti-employer. No doubt 
individual employers felt the teeth of these laws. But anti-enticement 
boosted the rights of the class of employers who depended on black 
workers. The anti-enticement laws created a right of security
242
 for 
employers in black workers as property,
243
 as well as a right of 
security in worker exploitation and oppression. An employer who 
offered higher wages and better working conditions to someone 
already under contract with another employer could be penalized more 
harshly than an employer who mistreated his or her workers.
244
 
Further, a laborer who left an employer to work for another employer 
offering higher wages could be forcibly returned to his or her former 
                                                 
238 Id.; Cohen, Involuntary Servitude, supra note 8, at 35–36. 
239
 Wiener, supra note 29, at 974 (quoting Alabama’s and Georgia’s anti-
enticement statutes); Cohen, Involuntary Servitude, supra note 8, at 35 (quoting 
Georgia’s anti-enticement statute). 
240
 Cohen, Involuntary Servitude, supra note 8, at 42 (describing the documentation 
system in South Carolina, Louisiana, Texas, and Arkansas). 
241 Id. See also HAY & CRAVEN, supra note 6, at 34 (explaining the British colonial 
practice of requiring discharge certificates or testimonials from former 
employers was a common way of putting an employer who might try to “poach” 
another employer’s workers on notice). 
242
 The notion of the right of security is drawn from SCHMIDT, supra note 118, at 5. 
Schmidt contrasts the right of workers to quit and the right of security for 
employers in unbreakable, definite contracts that interfered with the ability of 
workers to sell their labor freely. Id. 
243
 Cohen, Involuntary Servitude, supra note 8, at 35 (explaining that the 
enticement acts “re-created in modified form the proprietary relationship that 
had existed between master and slave”); see also Wiener, supra note 29, at 974 
(describing informal agreements among white planters not to hire away one 
another’s laborers because they saw black workers as “attached to the soil” and 
planters “as much their masters as ever”). 
244 See HAY & CRAVEN, supra note 6, at 34 (describing the implications of anti-
enticement statutes under master and servant law throughout the British 
colonies). 
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employer.
245
 Employers wielded the threat of anti-enticement as a 
weapon not only against other employers, but also against their 
employees.
246
 Black workers who quit to find better employment were 
harassed by their former employers with the threat of bringing charges 
of enticement against each new employer.
247
 
The anti-enticement laws sought to “turn off the spigot of jobs” for 
black workers who asserted control by quitting for better employment. 
More than a century later, IRCA would be predicated on the same idea 
of “turning off the spigot of jobs” to illegalize the hiring of 
undocumented workers. 
IV. DRAWING PARALLELS: CRIMINALIZING WORK AND NON-WORK 
A.  Captive Workers: State Power and Employers 
Prohibiting work and requiring work appear to be polar opposites. 
Yet the modern-day criminalization of work for undocumented 
immigrant workers shares important features with the post-Civil War 
South’s criminalization of non-work for black workers. Both systems 
of criminalization hand over state power to employers to control, 
repress, and coerce workers.
248
 The result is similar: depriving workers 
of the right to freely sell their labor and granting employers a 
comprehensive power to exploit.
249
 State power becomes an employer 
sword against workers.
250
 Law-breaking employers invoke IRCA’s 
ban on the employment of undocumented workers and the I-9 
verification apparatus to coerce workers into capitulating to illegal 
working conditions.
251
 They brandish IRCA and threats of arrest, 
detention, and deportation to rout undocumented workers who assert 
control by protesting abuses, organizing unions, or filing complaints 
with enforcement agencies.
252
 Analogously, southern planters invoked 
vagrancy and contract labor laws to immobilize black workers from 
                                                 
245
 Wiener, supra note 29, at 974. 
246 See Cohen, Involuntary Servitude, supra note 8, at 37 (providing examples in 
North Carolina where anti-enticement was used by employers to threaten and 
harass black workers who had quit or run away). 
247 Id. 
248 See supra text accompanying notes 124–40, 195–202. 
249 See supra Part II.C and text accompanying notes 170–80. 
250 See supra text accompanying notes 44–47. 
251 See supra text accompanying notes 48–51. 
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 Wishnie, supra note 13, at 215–16. 
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resisting exploitation and oppression, withholding their labor, or 
quitting in search of better opportunities.
253
 Southern planters used 
these laws on an as-needed basis to maintain a captive workforce when 
it served their interests.
254
 
Despite IRCA’s purported focus on employers, “turning off the 
spigot of jobs” is deployed by employers to control and discipline 
workers. IRCA deters many undocumented workers from quitting to 
protest exploitation or discrimination because they are concerned that 
it will be difficult to find alternative employment or better 
employment.
255
 An employer’s threat to terminate enforces a similar 
deterrent effect. So too, the post-Civil War anti-enticement statutes, 
despite their focus on employers, were used to deprive black workers 
of a right of access to alternative employment.
256
 Anti-enticement laws 
helped perpetuate a status quo of racial and labor repression, and 
inhumane working conditions. 
Further, the perverse outcomes produced by the anti-enticement 
laws are paralleled by the decisions in Sure-Tan and Hoffman. Under 
anti-enticement laws, employers who offered better jobs were 
punished as culprits rather than exploitative and oppressive employers; 
under IRCA, Sure-Tan, and Hoffman, undocumented workers fare 
much worse under state enforcement powers than exploitative 
employers who break immigration and labor laws.
257
 Blame is shifted 
from law-breaking employers to undocumented immigrant workers. 
                                                 
253 See supra text accompanying notes 189–93, 199. 
254 See Cohen, Involuntary Servitude, supra note 8, at 33 (“[T]he system of 
involuntary servitude that emerged after the Civil War was a fluid, flexible affair 
which alternated between free and forced labor in time to the rhythm of the 
southern labor market.”). Cohen explains that southern employers had the “tools 
to compel labor” when labor was scarce; “[w]hen labor was plentiful,” they did 
not need to resort to compulsion. Id. 
255 See supra text accompanying note 130; see also Holloway Sparks, Queens, 
Teens, and Model Mothers: Race, Gender, and the Discourse of Welfare 
Reform, in RACE AND THE POLITICS OF WELFARE REFORM 171, 178–81 (Sanford 
F. Schram et al. eds., 2006). 
256 See supra Part III.B. 
257 See Brownell, supra note 47, at 73–74 (discussing low risk of fines on 
employers who violate IRCA’s employer sanctions provisions and a “relatively 
small share of [INS and ICE] enforcement resources on employer sanctions”); 
Chishti & Kamasaki, supra note 55, at 5 (noting that funding for labor standards 
enforcement stagnated after IRCA and declined from 2001–2009); NELP, 
WORKERS’ RIGHTS ON ICE, supra note 51, at 10–11 (“[W]orkers themselves 
have borne the punitive brunt of the employment sanctions regime.”); Nessel, 
supra note 44, at 368 (noting that the NLRA back pay award is cheaper than 
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Enforcement of both systems of criminalization relies on 
verification of worker status, which becomes an instrument of control 
in the hands of employers. IRCA’s I-9 requirement of proof of 
authorization to work is leveraged offensively by unscrupulous 
employers to intimidate undocumented workers.
258
 In a similar 
manner, proof of certificates of employment and of discharge were 
used to subject black workers who lacked these documents to arrest for 
vagrancy or violation of contract labor laws, and the workers could 
then be forcibly returned to their former employers or subjected to 
compulsory labor with other employers.
259
 
For undocumented workers, Sure-Tan and Hoffman confer on law-
breaking employers virtually untrammeled power to retaliate against 
undocumented workers who organize.
260
 For black workers, vagrancy, 
contract labor, and anti-enticement laws formed core components of a 




Whether criminalizing work or non-work, the consequence for 
workers has been less equality, less freedom, and more coercion. 
Douglas Hay and Paul Craven caution that erecting a “dichotomous 
bright line between freedom and coercion . . . misleads about the 
realities of both slavery and employment.”
262
 They state, “Coercion is 
a complex continuum of forms and practices.”
263
 The legal treatment 
of today’s undocumented immigrant workers and of black workers 
after the Civil War underlines each group’s fraught relationship to 
equality and freedom. Undocumented workers occupy a contradictory 
status before the Supreme Court; they are simultaneously equal and 
unequal in that they are protected under United States labor law but 
                                                                                                                   
unionization and thus insufficient to deter employer abuse); Saucedo, supra note 
21, at 308 (explaining that IRCA’s employer sanctions provisions have “created 
an employment structure in which employers set up mechanisms to protect 
themselves from the sanctions and enforcement, and at the same time make 
employees vulnerable to both immigration and non-immigration consequences 
of working without authorization”). Saucedo explains that few of the Obama 
Administration’s worksite I-9 audits of employers under IRCA resulted in 
protecting workers against exploitative employers. Id. at 307–08. 
258 See supra text accompanying notes 145–50. 
259 See supra text accompanying notes 241, 245–46. 
260 See supra text accompanying notes 88, 124–28. 
261 See Cohen, Involuntary Servitude, supra note 8, at 33–34. 
262
 HAY & CRAVEN, supra note 6, at 28. 
263 Id. at 27. 
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denied the right to back pay to which other workers are entitled.
264
 
Under IRCA it is not illegal for undocumented immigrants to accept 
employment, but it is illegal for employers to hire them. Black 
workers, too, occupied a contradictory status after the Civil War. The 
legal restrictions on their mobility created a system of “compulsory 
free labor”
265
 that placed them in a “twilight zone” between freedom 
and slavery.
266
 For both undocumented and black workers, state action 
has been as pivotal as private employer action in undermining 
equality, freedom, mobility, and control. 
B.  Narratives in Support of Criminalization 
Whether criminalizing work through IRCA or non-work through 
vagrancy law, narratives of disobedience and disorder are harnessed to 
rationalize criminalization. For undocumented workers, the narrative 
focus is criminality. The emphasis on worker criminality in Hoffman 
endorses the narrative of undocumented workers as law-breakers who 
violate immigration laws, who defraud the public while duping 
employers, and who rob United States citizens of jobs while cheating 
other immigrants who play by the rules.
267
 
                                                 
264 See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 467 U.S. 883, 911–12 (1984) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (discussing the anomalous status of undocumented workers); see 
also Motomura, supra note 60, at 1726 (referring to role of “pervasive national 
ambivalence about immigration” in shaping evolution of rights of 
undocumented migrants). 
265
 COHEN, FREEDOM’S EDGE, supra note 8, at 11. 
266
 Daniel, supra note 191, at 89, 98. See Cohen, Involuntary Servitude, supra note 
8, at 33 (“[T]he system of involuntary servitude that emerged after the Civil War 
was a fluid, flexible affair which alternated between free and forced labor in 
time to the rhythm of the southern labor market.”). 
267 See supra text accompanying notes 91–101 (discussing the emphasis in Hoffman 
on the criminality of undocumented workers) and infra text accompanying note 
273 (Justice Scalia’s comments at oral argument in Hoffman). See, e.g., U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Attorney Gen., Memorandum for all Fed. Prosecutors (Apr. 11, 
2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/956841/download 
[https://perma.cc/DXB9-JWSG] (directing federal prosecutors to seek charges of 
aggravated identity theft against immigrants who use false documents). See also 
Nessel, supra note 44, at 390–91 (refuting claims that granting temporary or 
permanent work authorization for reporting workplace violations is a “reward 
for lawbreakers”); Lauren Gilbert, The (Aristotelian) Rhetoric of Immigration 
Reform (2013), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2283731 [https://perma.cc/X23F-
4PC4] (discussing political rhetoric around immigration); Christopher Ingraham, 
‘Go Home and Get in Line’: Fact-Checking Kris Kobach on DACA, WASH. 
POST (Sept. 7, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/09/07/go-home-and-get-
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Black workers in the post-Civil War South contended with a 
different but overlapping narrative. Vagrancy laws rested on the claim 
that black workers threatened the southern social and economic order 
by their idleness and laziness.
268
 Northern reformers feared that newly 
freed black men and women would irresponsibly exercise their new 
freedom by rejecting work,
269
 and suggested that vagrancy law and 
compulsory contracts were needed to school them “in the ways of the 
market and the wage system.”
270
 These racist narratives of idleness, 
                                                                                                                   
in-line-fact-checking-kris-kobach-on-
daca/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.0d10a54be8d1 [https://perma.cc/DG58-
Q9BD] (debunking the claims that undocumented immigrants should get in line 
and wait their turn); Miriam Valverde, Donald Trump’s Misleading Claims 
About Immigration in State of the Union Address, POLITIFACT (Jan. 31, 2018, 
6:20 PM), https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2018/jan/31/donald-
trumps-misleading-claims-about-immigration-/ [https://perma.cc/83UU-PM4H] 
(analyzing Trump’s claims about immigrants taking jobs from the poorest 
Americans, and labeling immigrants as terrorists and gang members); 
Immigration 101: Why Can’t Immigrants Just “Get Legal”, [sic] “Get in Line” 
and Get Their Papers?, AMS. VOICE (July 25, 2017), 
https://americasvoice.org/blog/immigration-101-why-immigrants-cant-just-get-
legal/ [https://perma.cc/5VL5-C847] (explaining the fallacy of “get-in-line” 
arguments); Why Don’t They Just Get in Line?: There is No Line for Many 
Unauthorized Immigrants, AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL (Aug. 12, 2016), 
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/why-don%E2%80%99t-
they-just-get-line [https://perma.cc/6FYN-F4TD]. 
268 See COHEN, FREEDOM’S EDGE, supra note 8, at 14–15 (explaining how freed 
Blacks’ rejection of the work forms of slavery and of “slavery’s hours and 
slavery’s pace” was perceived by whites as “idleness and indolence and served 
as confirmation that blacks needed white supervision”); Stanley, supra note 205, 
at 1285 (quoting the Freedmen’s Bureau Chief as believing that “[I]dleness was 
an intractable problem and neither persuasion nor threats overcame the 
freedmen’s reluctance to make contracts.”). 
269 See Stanley, supra note 205, at 1283 (“‘Freedom does not mean the right to live 
without work at other people’s expense,’ the bureau declared in 1865.”). The 
Bureau also proclaimed: “While the freedmen must and will be protected in their 
rights, they must be required to meet these first and most essential conditions of 
a state of freedom, a visible means of support, and fidelity to contracts.” Id. 
Northern beggars, harvest workers, and transient people, too, were denounced as 
idle and lazy outcasts who menaced society by rejecting work. Id. at 1276, 1282; 
see also White, supra note 7, at 682–83 (social reformers referred to transient 
people who traveled by railroad as “tramps” and saw them as “criminals, moral 
degenerates, ethnic or genetic inferiors, and diseased outcasts who had either to 
be removed from society or saved from themselves by the harshest of 
policies.”). 
270 See Stanley, supra note 205, at 1289 (describing the comments of the 
Freedmen’s Bureau Chief). 
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laziness, and personal irresponsibility continue to figure strongly 
against African Americans in current policy debates. Perhaps most 
notable is the stereotyping of African American women who receive 
welfare assistance as lazy “welfare queens,” a dominant theme that 
helped push welfare reform through the enactment of the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996.
271
 
Further, some perceive only a thin line between idleness and 
criminality. For example, one southern business owner decried, when 
trying to break the strike of black and white miners, “‘Idleness’ . . . 
‘always begets crime.’”
272
 For Justice Scalia, criminality also could 
beget idleness. During oral argument in Hoffman, Scalia commented 
that a “smart” undocumented worker would realize that he could 
exploit his lack of work authorization status to avoid a duty to mitigate 
back pay damages by arguing that he cannot lawfully work, and thus 
“just sit home and eat chocolates” and collect back pay.
273
 
The narratives of criminality and idleness, although distinct, 
coincide. They identify disobedient outsiders who disrupt the social 
order, and who, therefore, must be controlled.
274
 Policing the 
“criminality” of undocumented workers and the “work ethic” of 
African American workers has rested on the power of racialized 
narratives that excite fear and invite division.
275
 These narratives of 
“loafers” and “lawbreakers”
276
 have provided the pathos
277
 and 
organizing principle for criminalization. 
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 Sparks, supra note 255 (describing the racial politics of welfare reform and the 
dominating narrative of African American women as abusers of the welfare 
system). 
272
 Gerald Friedman, The Political Economy of Early Southern Unionism: Race, 
Politics, and Labor in the South 1880–1953, 60 J. ECON. HIST. 384, 402 (2000). 
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 Transcript of Oral Argument at 32–33, Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. 
N.L.R.B., 535 U.S. 137 (2002) (No. 00–1595). See Dannin, supra note 101, at 
401 (analyzing Justice Scalia’s concerns about mitigation of damages at the oral 
argument as “an argument to prevent a wily discriminatee from taking 
advantage of a hapless employer” and viewing the inability to mitigate damages 
through obtaining lawful employment as “essentially equivalent to or greater 
than the employer’s original violation”). 
274 See Stanley, supra note 205, at 1272. 
275
 COHEN, FREEDOM’S EDGE, supra note 8, at 15–16. See also Gilbert, supra note 
267. 
276
 Sparks, supra note 255, at 183 (explaining that the dominating narrative of 
welfare recipients as “loafers, lawbreakers, and immoral mothers” made it 
difficult for poor women of color who were welfare recipients to participate in 
the debate about welfare reform). Professor Sparks explains that non-citizens, 
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C.  The Rights of Other Workers 
Criminalizing work and non-work share another crucial dimension: 
labor repression and the race-to-the bottom resound beyond 
“criminalized workers.” Employers have always been cognizant “that 
the effect of a bounded sector under more coercive sanctions [is] to 
depress wages in the wider labor market as well.”
278
 Broader groups of 
workers are injured as employers use the criminalization of targeted 
workers to fracture worker unity, to sow division between workers, 
and to discipline workers, regardless of their citizenship or 
immigration status. 
The recognition that IRCA hobbles the ability of unions to defend 
their members and to organize new members led the AFL-CIO to 
reverse its support of IRCA and to call for its repeal in 2000.
279
 
Organizers from independent worker centers and mainstream unions 
alike lament that IRCA and Hoffman are potent tools for busting 
unions and undermining the right of freedom of association.
280
 As 
well, the criminalization of undocumented workers positions 
employers to dismantle labor standards for broader groups of workers. 
When undocumented workers are deterred from enforcing their rights 
against illegal employer conduct, citizens and legalized immigrant 
workers also have a harder battle enforcing their rights because they 
are pressured by employers to compete with undocumented 
workers.
281
 And enmity is stoked as employers appeal to racist 
                                                                                                                   
particularly those from China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, were also portrayed as 
cheating the welfare system. Id. at 181. 
277 See Gilbert, supra note 267 (discussing the use of ethos (credibility of the 
speaker), pathos (emotional state of the audience), and logos (internal logic of an 
argument) in persuasion). Pathos rests on the use of emotion to stir an audience 
for a particular goal. Id. Gilbert suggests that all three tools are used in 
advancing xenophobia and restrictionist immigration policies. Id. 
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 HAY & CRAVEN, supra note 6, at 32 (describing the purpose of master and 
servant law and the characteristics of indentured labor and other forms of 
bounded labor). 
279 See Nancy Cleeland, AFL-CIO Calls for Amnesty for Illegal U.S. Workers, L.A. 
TIMES (Feb. 17, 2000), http://articles.latimes.com/2000/feb/17/news/mn-65389 
[https://perma.cc/4AL9-NXXU]; AFL-CIO: End Sanctions, MIGRATION NEWS 
(Mar. 2000), https://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=2037 
[https://perma.cc/H5HU-WBNB]. 
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 Wishnie, supra note 13, at 212–214. 
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 KWONG, supra note 133, at 174; see also Wishnie, supra note 13, at 213–14; 
supra text accompanying note 131. 
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Like IRCA, southern vagrancy laws could be used to break strikes 
and unions. The planter class feared the biracial coalition of black 
workers and poor white southerners.
283
 Other southern employers also 
strived to defeat such coalitions with the help of elected officials and 
law enforcement.
284
 One scholar provides an example from Alabama 
in which striking black and white miners in 1908 had surmounted 
racial division to maintain solidarity throughout their strike.
285
 When 
other union-busting tactics fell short, the governor threatened to call 
upon the legislature to amend the vagrancy laws to authorize the arrest 
of striking black miners rendered “idle” by the strike.
286
 
White workers could also seek to use vagrancy as a tool against 
black workers whom they regarded as competitors who depressed 
local wages.
287
 In such instances, vagrancy appeared to be an attempt 
by white workers to drive black workers out of the local labor market. 
For instance, white longshoremen in New Orleans, who had united 
with black longshoremen to strike for better wages eight years earlier, 
called upon law enforcement in 1873 to “arrest as vagrants the ‘low, 
ignorant negroes, who slept under tarpaulins and in barrel houses, and 
who . . . could afford to work at lower than regular rates.’”
288
 The 
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 Gordon & Lenhardt, supra note 129, at 1177–78; Stuesse & Helton, supra note 
156. 
283 See STEVEN HAHN, THE ROOTS OF SOUTHERN POPULISM: YEOMAN FARMERS 
AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE GEORGIA UPCOUNTRY, 1850–1890, at 204–
25 (1983) (discussing challenges of the Republicans in forging unity between 
Blacks and white yeoman for electoral victories during Reconstruction). 
284 See ROGER W. SHUGG, ORIGINS OF CLASS STRUGGLE IN LOUISIANA 301 (1968) 
(describing how the unified strike of black and white longshoremen in 1865 for 
increased wages most likely caused anxiety about the prospect of racial 
solidarity in labor organizing); Friedman, supra note 272, at 402 (describing 
Alabama governor’s anti-union tactics in support of mine owners against 
striking black and white miners in 1908). 
285
 Friedman, supra note 272, at 402. 
286 Id. at 402. 
287 See SHUGG, supra note 284, at 301–02. 
288 Id. at 302. Shugg explains that eight years after the black and white 
longshoremen had led their joint strike in 1865, the racial animosity of white 
workers had intensified and economic depression had exacerbated the 
competition for jobs. Id. at 301–02. 
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In both examples—Alabama and New Orleans—the use of 
vagrancy as a weapon against black workers and biracial organizing 
was accompanied by claims of white supremacy.
290
 But labor 
repression in the service of white supremacy was used to bring down 
the wages of unskilled white laborers as well, forcing both Blacks and 
whites to work on terms dictated by employers.
291
 Evidence suggests 
that the wage rates paid to black workers kept the bar low for white 
workers, even when employers gave them preference.
292
 Often, 
though, southern planters preferred black laborers to white laborers 
because they perceived the latter as more demanding.
293
 
Finally, as discussed earlier, the repressive function of southern 
vagrancy laws broadened beyond black workers, as these laws became 
a template for laws in the urban North and Northern Plains that 
                                                 
289 Id. at 302. 
290 See id. (illustrating the racist statements made by white longshoremen seeking 
the arrest of black longshoremen); Friedman, supra note 272, at 402–03 (“[The 
Alabama governor] warned the union leadership that the [white] public was 
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miners.’”). 
291 See SHUGG, supra note 284, at 302 (discussing white longshoremen’s use of 
vagrancy laws against black longshoremen and noting that competition between 
black and white workers accrued to the benefit of employers in many sectors by 
reducing the wages of “the unskilled, white or black”); Friedman, supra note 
272, at 403 (discussing the appeals to white supremacy in breaking up striking 
miners). 
292 See JAMES L. ROARK, MASTERS WITHOUT SLAVES: SOUTHERN PLANTERS IN THE 
CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 165–66 (1977) (describing attempts by 
southern planters to recruit white immigrant workers in order to discipline or 
replace black workers). However, these attempts were largely unsuccessful 
because immigrants chose cities in the North over the South and those who 
stayed were “more expensive to feed and keep” than black workers. Id. at 167; 
SHUGG, supra note 284, at 302–03 (“[Steamboat companies] decided to 
discharge all Negroes and hire whites instead, but ‘at the same wages as are now 
paid to black [workers].’”). Planters tried to recruit immigrant workers to the 
South to threaten or replace black workers but often the immigrants refused to 
remain in the South where they were treated similarly to black workers, and 
instead went elsewhere for better opportunities. See id. at 254–59 (describing 
attempted use of Chinese, German, and Irish immigrant workers in the South 
and refusal of immigrant workers to remain in the South as cheap labor). 
293 See HAHN, supra note 283, at 163. 
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Despite strong evidence that IRCA’s employer sanctions have had 
a disastrous effect on low-wage workers and labor standards, repeal of 
employer sanctions does not figure into immigration reform debates. 
Proposals from both parties in Congress typically seek to enhance the 
I-9 system of documentation rather than dismantle it.
295
 The question 
faced by civil rights and immigrants’ rights communities, workers’ 
centers, trade unions, and other labor organizations is: what kind of 
worldview or framework is necessary for achieving the long-term goal 
of repealing employer sanctions? So long as IRCA is addressed only 
as immigration policy, the prospects for repeal will remain non-
existent because the attendant discourse reduces to divisive narratives 
of “insiders” and “outsiders” competing for jobs.
296
 The resultant 
                                                 
294 See supra text accompanying notes 205–30 (discussing vagrancy laws in the 
North and Northern Plains). 
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19, 2017), https://www.dailysignal.com/2017/02/19/how-illegal-immigration-
harms-black-americans-according-to-civil-rights-commissioner/ 
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discussion fuels antagonism and fans tensions between African 
Americans and immigrant communities. 
We thus need worker, community, legal, and media education 
projects that provide disenfranchised communities with new ways of 
understanding one another and can help build strategic alliances. This 
Article has attempted to examine IRCA through the prism of 
criminalization, and to juxtapose the modern day treatment of 
undocumented immigrant workers to the criminalization of black 
workers after the Civil War. Undeniably, these two experiences are 
distinct, not identical, and it would be inaccurate to equate them.
297
 
Yet new insights into shared histories of criminalization can help mend 
rifts between oppressed and exploited communities of color by 
breaking down misperceptions of one another. The parallels between 
criminalization of work and non-work point toward a deeper shared 
identity between African Americans and undocumented immigrants.
298
 
This common experience shows that criminalization has been used not 
only to perpetuate economic injustice, but also—more systemically—
to undermine equality, mobility, and control. As a result, both 
communities share a highly fraught relationship to freedom and 
                                                                                                                   
BRIDGING THE BLACK-IMMIGRANT DIVIDE 1 (2007) (quoting Alan Jenkins, 
Executive Director of The Opportunity Agenda: “The mainstream media have 
fixated on potential points of black/immigrant tension, looking for a conflict 
storyline. And that storyline has been amply fed by conservative anti-immigrant 
groups intent on driving a wedge between the two communities.”); PEW 
RESEARCH CENTER, THE STATE OF AMERICAN JOBS 48 (2016) (finding racial 
and ethnic differences in how workers view the impact of immigrants on United 
States jobs). “In 2016, whites are more likely than Hispanics and blacks to think 
that growing numbers of immigrants hurt workers: 54% of whites say that, 
compared with 44% of blacks and 18% of Hispanics.” Id. at 48. Ten years ago, 
64% of Blacks thought immigrants hurt U.S. workers. Id. The 20-point drop 
among Blacks in viewing immigrants as exerting a negative impact on jobs 
suggests new opportunities for organizing workers across race, ethnicity, and 
immigration-citizenship status. Id.; Chacón, supra note 31, at 467–68 
(discussing the claims by some in the civil rights movement that legalizing 
unauthorized migrants conflicts with the needs of African Americans). 
297 See Chacón, supra note 31, at 466–68 (explaining that some critics of the 
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https://www.jacobinmag.com/2014/04/the-left-and-labor-strategy 
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coercion. Perhaps this history and framework can contribute to a 
broadened worldview in which the self-interests of African Americans 
and low-wage immigrants of color not only intersect but converge to 
go beyond short-term pragmatic cooperation.
299
 
Hoffman affirmed the criminalization of undocumented workers in 
denying them the right to back pay under the NLRA, thereby 
invigorating narratives and legal interventions that splinter workers.
300
 
In contrast, the D.C. Circuit in Agri Processor Company v. N.L.R.B.301 
engaged in an alternative legal discourse that promotes unity between 
workers when it affirmed a “community of interests” between 
undocumented workers and co-workers who were citizens or legalized 
workers.
302
 Agri Processor, the employer, challenged the results of a 
union election, claiming both that undocumented workers were not 
covered under the NLRA, and could not be included in the same 
bargaining unit with legal workers because they lacked a community 
of interest.
303
 In essence, Agri Processor tried to use immigration 
status to drive a legal wedge between workers who had successfully 
unified. 
The D.C. Circuit rejected both arguments, and in addressing 
“community of interest,” found that Agri Processor “failed to show 
that the interests of undocumented workers as employees differ[ed] in 
any way from those of legal workers.”
304
 Agri Processor had argued 
that since the undocumented workers had no legitimate expectation of 
continued employment, they shared no community of interests with the 
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at 8. 
304 Agri Processor Co., 514 F.3d at 9. 
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authorized workers.
305
 The D.C. Circuit denied this attempt to divide 
workers, instead finding that undocumented workers and legal workers 
in the bargaining unit were “identical” when the undocumented 
workers “receive the same wages and benefits as legal workers, face 
the same working conditions, answer to the same supervisors, and 
possess the same skills and duties.”
306
 
By stressing “sameness,” Agri Processor took an important step 
toward a narrative in which the relationship between undocumented 
workers and citizens and other legalized workers is one of mutuality 
arising from a common plight and common interests.
307
 Its conception 
of “community of interest” supported the ability, willingness, and 
struggle of workers to identify with one another across the divide of 
citizenship and immigration status.
308
 
There is strong work carried on by workers, labor organizers, 
activists, and scholars that—like Agri Processor—counter the 
narratives of criminalization and division that IRCA’s employer 
sanctions and Hoffman represent. A few examples from the author’s 
experience include the work of the National Mobilization Against 
Sweatshops (“NMASS”) and the Coalition to Protect Chinatown and 
the LES. NMASS, an independent workers’ center in New York City, 
spearheads a campaign to bring together homecare workers from 
across the city. Comprised of Chinese, Caribbean, Puerto Rican, and 
African American women, NMASS organizes against mandatory 
                                                 
305 Id. at 3, 9. Agri Processor also argued a lack of community interest because 
including undocumented workers in the same bargaining unit diluted the votes 
of authorized workers. Id. at 9. The D.C. Circuit rejected this argument as well, 
holding that the votes of undocumented workers were just as valid as those of 
authorized workers since undocumented workers were indeed covered 
employees under the NLRA. Id. 
306 Id. See Motomura, supra note 60, at 1752–54, for Professor Motomura’s 
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harm coworkers who are U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents, or otherwise 
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unauthorized migrants and other persons whose welfare depends on how the law 
treats the unauthorized.” Id. 
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 In this respect, the D.C. Circuit opinion appears to go beyond a citizen proxy 
argument for protecting the rights of undocumented workers. 
308 See Gordon & Lenhardt, supra note 129, at 1236 (discussing “the role of law in 
the creation and perpetuation of the conflict that infects the relationship 
“between” African American and Latino immigrant low-wage workers, and the 
need for “legal interventions” to support cooperation between workers). 
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unpaid overtime in the industry.
309
 Similarly, the Coalition to Protect 
Chinatown and the LES unites low-income residents from New York’s 
lower east side—Chinese immigrants and working-class African 
Americans, Puerto Ricans, and whites—to challenge municipal 
rezoning policies that promote gentrification and displacement.
310
 In 
both areas of work, those who are most affected come to recognize 
over time through engagement, discussion, community education, and 
joint action that—regardless of race, ethnicity, culture, or immigration 




Scholars, journalists, and activists are also critical to this work. 
These efforts include the scholarship of Professors Jennifer Gordon 
and R.A. Lenhardt in untangling the complex interactions between 
                                                 
309
 Interview by Shirley Lung, Professor, City University of New York School of 
Law, with JoAnn Lum, Program Director, NMASS, in N.Y.C., N.Y. (June 1, 
2018) (describing NMASS’s Ain’t I A Woman Campaign organizing home care 
workers challenging mandatory 24-hour shifts for which they are not paid for 
the entire shift). See, e.g., Caroline Lewis, Round-the-Clock Care, Half-the-
Clock Pay, VILLAGE VOICE (Aug. 2, 2018), 
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workers to challenge state regulations that permit employers to pay for only 
thirteen hours of each twenty-four hour shift). 
310 See THE COLLECTIVE FOR CMTY., CULTURE AND THE ENV’T & PRATT CTR. FOR 
CMTY. DEV., PRESERVING AFFORDABILITY & AUTHENTICITY: 
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CHINATOWN WORKING GROUP (2013) (detailing the 
rezoning study and plan to preserve Chinatown, the Lower East Side, and 
surrounding areas); CWG Rezoning Plan, COALITION TO PROTECT CHINATOWN 
& LES, https://peoplefirstnyc.org/people-first-rezoning-plan/ 
[https://perma.cc/V9HJ-5PJ3] (last visited Aug. 21, 2018) (describing goals of 
the Coalition); Open Letter to NY Elected Officials, COALITION TO PROTECT 
CHINATOWN & LES (Sept. 28, 2016), https://peoplefirstnyc.org/2016/09/ 
[https://perma.cc/Q86K-8ZVC] (protesting city rejection of community-
generated rezoning plan offered by Chinese, Latino, African American, and 
Caucasian residents in New York City’s Manhattan Community Board 3). 
311
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IMMIGRANTS RIGHTS AND RACIAL JUSTICE 3 n.1 (profiling sixteen organizations 
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African Americans and new Latino immigrant low-wage workers for a 
more nuanced understanding of the conflict between them and to better 
identify how these groups can unify.
312
 Likewise, the research of 
Professors Angela Stuesse and Laura Helton in tracing the history of 
African Americans and Latino immigrants in Mississippi’s poultry 
processing industry shows how “different points of entry into US 
systems of racial inequality and low-wage work” lead African 
American and Latino poultry workers to arrive at different 
interpretations of workplace abuses.
313
 Understanding the “historical, 
structural, and personal rationale for these differences,” rather than 
erasing them, they believe, can help forge collaboration.
314
 
As well, African American journalists and activists urge African 
American communities against the dangers of immigrant 
scapegoating.
315
 Some also criticize organized labor for abdicating its 
responsibility to construct alliances between immigrants and African 
Americans by addressing the needs of the black working class 
alongside organizing Latino and Asian immigrants.
316
 Other labor 
commentators seek to publicize worker struggles in which African 
American, white, and Mexican slaughterhouse workers in the South 
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313
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315 See OPPORTUNITY AGENDA, supra note 296, at 20–21 (recommending 
approaches in the media and the press to advocate for unity between African 
Americans and immigrants). The Opportunity Agenda Report made 
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2007), 
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Choices for Black Labor, BLACK COMMENTATOR (Jun. 21, 2007), 
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316 See Fletcher, Labor Strategy, supra note 298 (discussing organized labor’s 
recognition of the strategic importance of Latino and Asian immigrants but its 
failure to retain a specific focus on the black working class). Fletcher states, 
“Many of the efforts to organize immigrants, for instance, have paid little to no 
attention to the construction of alliances with African Americans.” Id. This, he 
maintains, has increased tensions between African American and immigrant 
communities. Id. 
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This Article is a small piece of a larger effort to construct 
frameworks and narratives that support immigrants and citizens to 
come together to advance one another’s rights—not just as a means for 
protecting citizens and other legalized workers
318
—but as a necessity 
based on mutuality arising from shared conditions and shared interests. 
This Article offers a historical perspective to help deepen a sense of 
shared identity between undocumented immigrants and African 
Americans. For it is relationships of shared identity—rather than ones 
of pragmatism or even of solidarity—that hold the most promise for 
building alliances to take apart systems of criminalization. 
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